Foreign Service Journal

OCTOBER 1963 50c
Part 1 of Two Parts

"Morning Mist," *by Lynn Millar*



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PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION

The Editorial Board of the Foreign Service Journal considers the articles submitted. If accepted, the author will be paid one cent a word at time of publication. Art photographs, if accepted, will be purchased at two dollars each. Negatives and color transparencies are not acceptable. Photos should be black and white glossies, measuring approximately 7 x 10 inches, and should be mailed between extra heavy cardboard. Photos are not returned, and the Journal is not responsible for the return of unsolicited material.

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BIRTHS

AMITAY. A son, Michael Philip, born to Mr. and Mrs. Morris Amitay, on July 14, in Naples.

HART. A son, David Erickson, born to Mr. and Mrs. Samuel F. Hart, on March 24, at Bandung.

DEATHS

CHUTTER. Reginald F. Chutter, FSR, died on July 26, in Washington. Mr. Chutter, after twenty-five years in private business, entered Government service in 1948. He served at Athens, Taipei, Beirut and Ankara where he was assigned as chief of the Trade Development Branch, AID, at the time of his death. (Contributions to the Chutter Memorial Scholarship may be sent to Phillips Academy, Andover, Mass.)

HIGGS. Mrs. Marice Higgs, wife of L. Randolph Higgs. FSO-retired, died on July 14, in Daytona Beach, Florida.

HURLEY. Major General Patrick Jay Hurley, former Ambassador, died on July 30, in Santa Fe. General Hurley served the U. S. Government as Secretary of War under Herbert Hoover and as a trouble-shooting diplomat for Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. He was Ambassador to China from 1944-1946.

TRUEWORTHY. Christopher Barry Trueworthy, son of Mr. and Mrs. Orson W. Trueworthy, died on July 31, at Children's Hospital, Washington.

ZELLERBACH. James D. Zellerbach, former Ambassador to Italy, died on August 3, in San Francisco. Mr. Zellerbach, board chairman of the Crown Zellerbach Corporation, headed the special Marshall Plan mission to Italy in 1948 and served as an alternate delegate to the UN, before his appointment to Rome in 1956.

AFSA: Minutes of Recent Board of Directors' Meetings

July 16, 1963—The Board discussed an appeal to AFSA, as an employee organization, to participate in raising funds for the proposed National Cultural Center. As it had been ascertained that the fund-raising drive recently completed in the Department (and all other Government agencies in Washington) was not to be extended to personnel serving abroad, the Board decided to seek contributions from the membership for a donation in the name of AFSA to the building fund of the Center. Preparations for the AFSA Annual General Meeting in September were discussed.

July 30, 1963—The Board received a progress report on the Insurance Committee's explorations of a possible AFSA group insurance policy on personal effects. It learned with regret that amendments to the Foreign Service Act that might be adopted by the current Congress would very probably not include provision for relief to Foreign Service personnel for loss or damage to personal effects. The Board noted with appreciation the receipt of a contribution of $230.00 for the AFSA Scholarship Fund from the State-USIA Recreation Association derived from enrollment fees of students in a course in mnemonics given by Mr. Ernest L. Crosson. A memorandum from the chairman of the Committee on Education commending the valuable services of Mr. Clarke Slade, Educational Counselor, was noted and heartily endorsed by the Board. The Board discussed the Department's Anouncement No. 1—Lateral Entry Requirements (FAMC No. 130 of July 24, 1963). The resignation of Mr. Murray E. Jackson as Chairman of the Entertainment Committee was accepted with regret and Mr. Karl Ackerman was approved as his successor.

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AAFSW: Yesterday and Today

MEMBERS of the Association of American Foreign Service Women meeting early this month at the opening luncheon of their 1963-64 season, will celebrate the 35th year that Foreign Service women have been having such luncheons.

We're greatly indebted to Ambassador James Stewart for information pinpointing our origins and cherish a letter we received which pointed out that, in the fall of 1928, Mrs. Robert Keiser proposed to her friends Mrs. J. J. Murphy and Mrs. Stewart the idea of regular F. S. "ladies' luncheons." The three ladies approached Mrs. Wilbur Carr and Mrs. William Castle on the matter, who thought the idea a splendid one, and the first of what were to become regular monthly F. S. ladies luncheons was held.

Perusing old copies of the JOURNAL in the Department's library, we found the first reference to these luncheons in the issue of January 1929. Describing a luncheon held on December 15, 1928 which was attended by twenty-eight women, it notes that "several of the wives of the officers on duty at the Department have met this way a number of times during the fall . . . [and] the wives of officers newly-arrived in Washington, or just visiting, have received much helpful advice and suggestions from their Service 'sisters' who have been located in the city longer periods." An article in the JOURNAL of February of the same year calls attention to another useful purpose served by the luncheons: "Aside from the opportunity the gatherings offer for officers' wives visiting the city to meet those permanently in Washington, several ladies en route to new posts have been able to gather valuable information from those who have lived at the same or similar posts."

AAFSW offers the services of its desk in the Foreign Service Lounge to the newcomer to Washington and a variety of ways to help those going overseas have been worked out. The desk, which is staffed each week by volunteers on duty from 9:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., maintains an excellent housing file and a wealth of information on subjects of interest to new arrivals ranging from baby-sitters to local schools. It also has on sale the useful booklet "Assignment Washington" which has often been likened to a Washington Post Report. This booklet has been so popular it is now being prepared for a fourth printing.

Through its Wives Training Committee, AAFSW tries to supplement official training available to wives at the Foreign Service Institute. Language classes, for example, are provided so that wives unable to attend regular classes at FSI can maintain fluency or learn a new language. The committee also organizes seminars on subjects of interest to F. S. women, ranging from informal orientation discussions for wives new to the Service to area round tables for discussions in depth.

Though some of the techniques may be new, the basic ideas which inspired those first "ladies luncheons" thirty-five years ago remain the same, and AAFSW is carrying out the aims of those pioneer Foreign Service women.

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New Board Member



Christian Chapman
Foreign Service Journal
Board Member

I WAS an accident of war. When my father went over there in 1917, my mother was already there and thus I was born in Paris (France that is). I started my education at Miss Fine's Finishing School for Girls in Princeton, New Jersey, and ended it at the finest of finishing schools for men, Princeton University. I had a rather long career there as I started in 1939 and only graduated in 1948, one of the oldest living undergraduates. This prolonged career stemmed from the difficulties experienced abroad those years. I shared those difficulties as a fighter pilot for the Free French Air Force which was then integrated with the Royal Air Force. I had gone over to London somewhat early, finding even Princeton a little tame for the times, but when the U.S. became in turn involved, I found that USAF had higher standards—physical, that is—than I could meet. So I remained with the French-British: *Honneur oblige.* Graduating in June 1948, I had been told that there was a tremendous career to be had in the Department of State. Fame, glitter, beautiful women, exotic countries, international adventures, all were the lot of Foreign Service officers—I was told. So I took the written examination in September 1948 and the orals in March 1949. Having passed, I was permitted to wait until November 1950 (twenty-six months after the written) to be sworn into that privileged tribe of FSO's. Since then I have performed the rituals of the tribe in Morocco, Iran, Viet Nam, Laos, and Washington, and now for the coming year am being put out to pasture in the lush fields of Fort McNair. — *C.C.*

Palamos *by Lynn Millar*

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Is There an East-West Struggle?

by LEO MOSER

OUR newspapers speak daily of the current international conflict in the superficial terms of East versus West; contemporary historians conjure up the image of a world facing a decision between the values of the West and those of the East; creators of science fiction have envisioned a horror-world of the future with West and East locked in eternal conflict.

Many Americans seem to accept the concept of an East-West struggle in one form or another as a valid characterization of the facts of international life. But is such a frame of reference the proper one? Is it in our interest to allow the lines of battle to be thus drawn?

Central to the analysis of the struggle in which we are engaged is the question: who are "we" and who are "they"? The most common distinction used by Moscow is that of "Socialism" against "Capitalism." However, any strictly economic approach is not usually acceptable to Americans, being pragmatists in the field of economics rather than narrow ideologists. When they desire to be vague or to associate neutrals with their point of view, the Communists often divide the world more crudely into the "progressive forces" and "world reaction." A typical set of words that our side uses is that of the "Free World" versus "Communist Imperialism," terms obviously unacceptable to the other side. When our political scientists wish to be somewhat more precise, they use such terms as "modern multi-party democracy" versus "totalitarian Marxism." While much more exact, such ponderous terms are rarely used in practice.

The terms "East" and "West" are, however, among those most commonly used, having the advantage of being short, graphic, and superficially inoffensive to both sides. Soviet acceptance of this frame of reference has been evidenced in the names for their space vehicles: *Vostok I, II*, etc. American acceptance of this terminology can be evidenced by a quick glance at almost any U. S. newspaper.

From the point of view of our side, however, the continual use of the terms "East" versus "West" to describe the current struggle has been most unfortunate. There are many considerations worthy of mention.

LEO MOSER, presently Political Officer at Caracas, has served in Hong Kong, the Department, Moscow and Frankfurt.

EAST-WEST STRUGGLE?

1. "East" and "West" when used to contrast Russia with Western Europe are specialized historical terms which had their origin in the early medieval period. The distinction being made was originally between Eastern and Western Christendom, that is, between Rome and Byzantium. The use of such parochial European terminology in the present world has given the impression to the uninformed masses of Asia that the Soviet Union is in some way associated with Asian civilization and closer to the peoples of the East. This is simply not true, and to allow such a false image is greatly to our disadvantage. As a matter of fact, during the last several hundred years, it has been the people of Western Europe, not Eastern Europe, who have had long and intimate contact with the peoples of Asia and Africa. When Communist China chose an alphabet, it quite naturally chose the Roman and not the Cyrillic.

2. The "East-West" concept is not a dynamic one. You cannot change geography. Poland will always be east of Paris regardless of its political affiliations. Constant use of the terms "East" and "West" tends to reinforce the status-quo in Eastern Europe, by making its adherence to the "East" appear a natural and geographically predetermined fact.

3. Constant use of the terms "East-West" tends to strengthen the concept of a bipolar world. This presents many nations with a feeling that they live in an Either/Or world. Fear of having to make a decision one way or the other may have encouraged some leaders to adopt an artificial policy of neutralism in order to avoid commitment and thus to retain a feeling of independence. The very words "East" and "West," forming as they do a natural dichotomy, strengthen this outlook and give an undeserved "psychological equality" to the USSR. What little appeal the *troika* principle in the UN may have is based on the concept of an equal East and West and the consequent need for neutral mediation.

4. In the emerging nations, so preoccupied with problems of economic growth, the words East and West have had the effect of reinforcing the Communist thesis that such a nation has but two alternative roads open to it for entering the industrial world—that used by the West or that used by the East (that is, by the U.S.S.R.). By falsely equating pre-1917 conditions in Russia with the current situation in the underdeveloped nation in question, the rate of growth achieved by the U.S.S.R. is promised—if only Communism is embraced. Moreover, the pattern and methods of the Soviet Union are claimed appropriate to the non-Western world, since they better reflect conditions there.

5. Continual use of the East vs. West theme has contributed to the strengthening of a racist approach to contemporary international affairs, conjuring up the impression that the "peoples of Africa and Asia" (the non-white races) are aligned against Western Europe and the United States (the whites). A good deal of confused thinking in India may have been the result of this concept of East vs. West. Racial and cultural differences among the Soviet Union, China, India, or even Africa are thus overlooked, the common

opponent is the Dutchman or the Portuguese. Since the term "colony" as presently used in UN debates cannot, by definition, be applied to the holdings of a member of the Afro-Asian (or Eastern) bloc, and is restricted to "Western" possessions, there can be no such thing as a "Russian colony." The fact that Russians are members of the white race and rule millions who are not is conveniently ignored. (Note: The Russians may not always have this advantage. It may well be that Chinese Communist pretensions to leadership of the "Eastern Bloc" are partially based on the fact that they feel they have a natural racial advantage and that they can expose the Russians as the Europeans that they are.)

6. The term East still contains a certain mystic content in some intellectual or would-be intellectual circles. Since the nineteenth century there has been a strong tendency in Western thought to look on the mysterious East as the source of great things to come, the answer to our spiritual problems, or the inevitable wave of the future. This mysticism tends to offset the one major disadvantage for the other side of the terms "East" and "West," *i.e.* the association of the East with backwardness and the West with progress, for it sees the past roles as soon to be reversed, history having come a full cycle. The Common Market, and the continued vitality of Europe that it expresses, may eventually force some to drop their unfounded assumption that by some mystic force the future automatically belongs to the "East."

7. Continued use of a simple East-West breakdown has not allowed for proper differentiation between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist regime. Since China is a true representative of what is usually termed "Far Eastern Civilization," reference to the Soviet bloc as the "East" has made China's association seem inevitable. We should not continue to impose a set of terms which makes the description of a permanent Sino-Soviet rift seem illogical.

8. A final, and perhaps the most tragic, failing of the words "East" and "West" is that they have had the effect of alienating Russian opinion. The Russian people, and particularly the intelligentsia, feel very much a part of European civilization. There is much less attraction toward the Orient in the present day Soviet Union than in the United States, whether it be in terms of Japanese prints or Chinese cooking. As a matter of fact, one sees almost no evidence of popular Russian interest in the civilizations that lie to the east of Moscow, while there is an almost frantic interest in everything that lies to the west. As it is a goal of our policy to move the Russian people in the direction of the political values and the democratic practices which had their modern origin in Western Europe, we should not cut off the Russian people from these influences by characterizing them as somehow different from the rest of Europe.

Many terms are needed to define all aspects of the present international struggle. In certain contexts both sides must be seen as plural. We must picture the modern democratic ideal with its roots in many cultures and its devoted adherents in all nations as struggling against multi-sided oppo-

by Leo Moser

sition, of which the Soviet regime is only the most powerful single component at the present. In other contexts, we must picture all nations as having their role to play in combating the Communist threat to their freedom, as they had previously met the Nazi challenge.

The terms "East" and "West" need not be totally avoided; there are various contexts in which they have clear semantic content. But they should not be allowed to distort the basic issues which divide the Free World and the Soviet Bloc. To help break down past usage of the terms, we could, for example, usefully introduce the same dichotomy into the Bloc, deseribing the Moscow-dominated ideology as "Western communism" and the Chinese ideology as "Eastern communism."

Communists have always been extremely careful in the selection of terminology. The words Americans use are all too often chosen as much for their convenience in saving headline space as for any other reason.

We must be continually aware that the proper choice of words is extremely important. New words are seldom coined when new distinctions must be made, but instead we choose from the storehouse of words an old term to convey a new idea, problem or distinction. We must be continually alert to the fact that every old word so adapted brings with it ancient connotations and impressions.

Above all, the fact remains that there is no real struggle between Western and Eastern civilizations and we should not attempt to create the impression that such conflict exists.

Editor's Postscript:

The question posed in the title of Mr. Moser's article, "Is There an East-West Struggle?," must clearly be answered in the affirmative, if by the term "West" is meant the principal non-Communist states of Western Europe and North America, and if by "East" is meant the Soviet, or Sino-Soviet bloc. It is true that the terms "East" and "West" as used here are none too accurate and are often misinterpreted as having broader connotations than intended. Actually—and historically—these terms arose almost spontaneously as a convenient shorthand for the conflict between the U. S. and its associates on one hand, and the U.S.S.R. and its satellites on the other, divided as they were at the end of World War II by the Elbe line through central Germany and Europe, a line quickly becoming the "iron curtain" frontier of the cold war.

Mr. Moser is quite right, however, that this conflict did not then, and does not now, connote a struggle between oriental and occidental cultures. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that the terms so ambiguous were chosen, but once in common use they are difficult to change. The continued use of this dichotomous concept of "East-West" should be clearly understood as deriving its limited meaning only from recent European history and geography, not from any basic and enduring antagonism between Eastern and Western civilizations.



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

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October, 1938

by JAMES B. STEWART

"Skåling" in Oslo

JEFFERSON Patterson, First Secretary, Oslo, has an amusing and gayly illustrated article in the October 1938 JOURNAL titled, "Dinner Time in Norway."

"Between three and five," writes Jeff, "begins the principal meal of the day—and for some the principal occupation. Even on Sundays, sport, which vies with eating as the most absorbing business and pleasure of the country, yields to the lure of roast duck, or goose. . . All assemble round the table and remain there for 'five quarters of an hour.' . . If, however, foreigners are to be entertained, this culinary routine is abandoned and, out of apparent consideration of the outlander's habits, invitations specify eight as the hour for dinner or 'middag.' . ."

Jeff continues: . . . "Once the entire group has been noted as present, the doors of the dining room fly open and the guests . . . advance two and two, in order of rank, to their places. While titles of nobility have been done away with, in this supposedly democratic country, their disappearance has given everyone an opportunity of assuming one for himself so that he is humble indeed who cannot be called by something more striking than 'Herr."

Interruption 1963: People are still assuming titles. A recent news item from England tells of a man there who was tired of being called just plain mister and changed his first name to "Lord." His wife changed her name to "Lady."

Jeff continues: "A glass filled with sherry appears conspicuously before each guest but he should not appear to notice it until the host, after the first spoonful of soup, greets the guests with a short speech ending with the magic words 'Velkommen til bords.' After this, drinking and 'skåling' becomes general. It is considered polite for a man to 'skål' first with the lady on his right and then with her on his left. . .

"Norwegian dinners are like matrimony in being something not to be entered into lightly or unadvisedly, since they last almost as long as some present-day unions. Not until twelve or one o'clock do the tea and cakes arrive with their ceremonial significance of permissible leavetaking and even then one is not certain of home."

Cultural Relations Established

A Departmental order reads: "For the purpose of encouraging and strengthening cultural relations and intellectual cooperation between the United States and other countries, it is hereby ordered that there shall be established in the Department of State a Division of Cultural Relations.

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25 Years Ago

"Dr. Ben M. Cherrington has been appointed Chief of the Division."—*September, 1938.*

Comment 1963: Dr. Cherrington has been Director, Rocky Mountain Office, Institute of International Education, for a number of years.

A daughter, Mary Glasgow Curtis, was born on June 7, 1938, to Vice Consul and Mrs. Glion Curtis at Wellington, New Zealand.

Comment 1963: Mary became a Foreign Service officer and then married FSO Curtis W. Kamman. They were both Class 7 when Mary resigned and Curtis was assigned to Mexico City. He is doing visa work and Mary is expecting. Glion, who is Chargé at Port au Prince, writes: "Our oldest boy Tig (Edward Glion) is finishing his freshman year at Washington University, St. Louis."

A daughter, Dorothy Louise Emmerson, was born on April 3, 1938, to Mr. and Mrs. John Kenneth Emmerson in Osaka, where Mr. Emmerson is Vice Consul.

Comment 1963: Minister-Counselor John Emmerson writes from Tokyo: "Dottie was born in Kyoto and not Osaka. She graduated from Colorado College in 1960 and has been pursuing a theatrical career during the past year and a half. She is a member of the cast of the production 'South Pacific,' now at the Thunderbird Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada.

"Don, who is two years younger than Dottie, graduated from Princeton in 1961 and is now North American Representative for the International Student Council with headquarters in Leiden, Holland."

Moore-Durbrow. Miss Emily Maitland Moore and Elbridge Durbrow, American Consul at Naples, were married on July 23, 1938, in London.

Comment 1963: Durby met Emily in Moscow where she was visiting the Ambassador's daughter. A former Ambassador, he is now Deputy U.S. Representative, NATO, Paris. There are two sons, Bruce, 23, and Chandler, 17. Bruce is a senior at the University of California and plans to take the Foreign Service exams. Chandler is in prep School in Pebble Beach, California.

Breckenridge-Hornbeck. Mrs. Vivienne Barkalow Breckenridge and Dr. Stanley Hornbeck of the Department of State, were married in Denver, on August 24, 1938.

Comment 1963: Dr. Hornbeck, a State Department Far Eastern authority for many years, retired as Ambassador to the Netherlands. He and Mrs. Hornbeek enjoy living in Washington, where he recently passed Milestone 80. Two days before that event Dr. Hornbeck was elected to membership in The Century Association of New York. Joy continues with the happy couple!

Regarding the Oldest Profession

"When a diplomat says yes he means perhaps; when he says perhaps he means no; when he says no he is no diplomat.—*Anon.*

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"DIPLOMACY: The patriotic art of lying for one's country." — Ambrose Bierce, *The Devil's Dictionary*

• • •

"An ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the commonwealth."—Henry Wotton (1604)

• • •

"The demands upon the Foreign Service in this country and abroad in terms of knowledge, in terms of an understanding of what our Nation is all about, in terms of the forces which are reshaping the world in which we live, are larger than they have ever been in the past and they will not shrink in the future."—Dean Rusk

• • •

"DIPLOMACY: Lying in state."—*Cynic's Calendar*

• • •

"A man who is base at home will not acquit himself with honor when he is sent to represent his country abroad: the place will be changed, but not the man."—Aeschines, *Ctesiphontem* (337 B.C.)

• • •

"There are a large number of well-meaning ambassadors . . . who belong to what I call the pink-tea type, who merely reside in the service instead of working in the service." — Theodore Roosevelt: Letter to R. H. Davis, Jan. 3, 1905.

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"A diplomat is a man who must think twice before saying nothing."—G. L. Mehta, former Indian Ambassador to the U.S.

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". . . To say nothing, especially when speaking, is half the art of diplomacy." —Will Durant, *The Age of Reason Begins*

• • •

"It is fortunate that diplomats generally have long noses, since usually they cannot see beyond them." —P. Claudel

• • •

"Nobody, not even the most rabid of democrats, can imagine without actual knowledge all the emptiness and quackery that passes for diplomacy."—Otto Von Bismarck

—Compiled by John P. McKnight

Candide

by Robert W. Rinden

ONCE there was a young man by the name of Candide, who read books—good books. Some of the books were so good they could even be sold to Hollywood. They were *that* good. They told why our Foreign Service is no good, why our foreign policies are no good, why our foreign aid programs are no good—E-V-E-R-Y-T-H-I-N-G. The reason for this is simple, those books said: our Foreign Service officers don't get out and live with the people. Instead, they stay in the cities where the embassies, the consulates, the aid missions and the foreign government offices are.

Candide was so distressed that he resolved to enter the Foreign Service and, through his own dedicated example, help to reform it.

So he entered the Foreign Service and was sent to open a consulate in a city in a faraway land.

He went alone because the Department found it had no travel funds to send the rest of the post's personnel complement until the next fiscal year. (Some bookkeeper had misplaced a decimal point by eight places.)

After one night in the city where the Department thought it would be nice to have a consulate, he set out—far out into the jungle, where the people were. There he would live among them and learn their language, their dances, their musical instruments, their folkways, their mores. Right away he won their adoration by his awesome magic of striking two stones together and making fire. Ever after, he was affectionately known as "The Stony Fireman."

Meanwhile back in the city, telegrams and airgrams from the Department were piling up in the post office, awaiting the American Consul's call. Among all this debris were telegrams about the impending arrival of a very important fact-finding mission from Washington, including three wives, a military escort officer and a Department escort officer. Minute and conflicting instructions were given on how to care for the VIP party.

On the thirteenth day of Candide's life with the people, the VIP's arrived in a special aircraft. There was no one at the airport to greet them, to attend to the baggage, to handle passport and customs formalities, to transport them to the hotel. No hotel reservations had been made, no appointments with foreign officials requested, no cocktail receptions or dinner parties planned, no orientation or shopping tours set up, no briefings or briefing materials prepared. . .

The American Consul was out living with the people.

BACK in Washington, Candide doesn't have too much chance these days to use what he learned on his first overseas assignment. As he modestly says: "You can't master a language in two weeks—and that's all I had."

But he does enjoy the opportunity at FSI to read books and hear lectures about some of the things the Foreign Service does that the earlier story-tellers never told him: negotiating economic and military aid agreements, springing celebrative compatriots from the local jailhouse, seeking export opportunities for American firms, issuing new passports and worldly advice to countrymen who get rolled, interpreting political events and omens, arranging care and repatriation for ill and injured American seamen, and many other functions.

And the greatest of these, Candide insists, is extending all appropriate assistance and courtesies to VIP's when they come to foreign cities, where the embassies and the consulates and the aid missions and the foreign government offices are.

MORAL: *Of the making of books, of the taking of trips—there is no end; and much is the grief thereof.*

Russia and the West

by J. W. FULBRIGHT

BECAUSE of the vast discrepancy between Communist ideology and historic reality, we can, I think, be quite certain that communism as Marx and Lenin conceived it will not prevail in the world. It will not prevail because it is at variance with the real world and could only be brought about by the one kind of revolution it is incapable of precipitating, a revolution in the nature of man. Men and nations, however, are often moved not by what is true but by what they *believe* to be true. In this sense, it is not communism that challenges the free world but the misconceptions which communism fosters, of which the most dangerous is its claim to universal validity. The task of Western policy, therefore, is not directly to destroy communism as an ideology—an enterprise which the erosions of time and history rather than acts of statecraft will accomplish—but to demonstrate the futility and danger of its misconceptions, while our major energies are dedicated to the strengthening and improvement of our own society.

Ideas are the prisons of ideologues, a rule to which the communists are no exception. "From enthusiasm to imposture," wrote Gibbon, "the step is perilous and slippery; the demon of Socrates affords a memorable instance how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man may deceive others, how the conscience may slumber in a mixed and middle state between self-illusion and voluntary fraud."[1]

The devolution of communist ideology from "enthusiasm" to "imposture" reflects the growing divergence between a stagnant idea and an evolving reality. Communism in its classical form represented a response to the brutal upheavals and abuses of the industrial revolution in its early stages. Marx's manifesto, however, became a quasi-religion and a mover of events in its own right. Unchanged in their broad assumptions and tenets in over a hundred years, the basic ideas of communism have become increasingly divorced from the realities of modern Western industrial society, holding their adherents, nonetheless, in an intellectual prison in which observed facts are rejected or distorted to fit the specifications of a specious doctrine.

The success of communism as a revolutionary force in the world is not the product of its fundamentally defective doctrine but rather the result of the impact and example of the Soviet state, which, through discipline, hard work, and the forcible exaction of great sacrifices from its people, converted backward Russia into a powerful modern industrial society in the span of a single generation. The defectiveness of communist theory, however, in no way implies that the leaders of Russia and China are not motivated by its tenets in the shaping of national policy. The important factor here is not the validity or invalidity of doctrine but the fact that it is *believed* to be valid by the men who have power in the communist world.

There is every reason to believe that the men who rule Russia today are no less persuaded than were Lenin and Trotsky of the validity of communism, of the universality of its mission, and of the inevitability of its triumph. Khrushchev, so far as I am able to gauge his character, manages to be both ideologue and opportunist, a narrow-minded mystic in his view of the world and its destiny and a practical realist in devising tactics for guiding human destiny along its preordained course.

If the West is successfully to thwart the communist dream of universal empire, it is less important for us to know *why* the Soviet leaders wish to "bury" us than to know *how* they propose to do it. It is very clear that they do not intend to leave the process to the mystical force of history, however "inevitable" its outcome. They are going to help the process along with all of their resources and it is the task of Western statesmen to estimate what those resources are, the way in which they have been used in the past, and how they are likely to be used in the future.

There is nothing in either communist theory or Soviet practice to suggest a propensity for suicidal risks. "The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism," wrote George Kennan some years ago, "has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it. The forces of progress can take their time in preparing the final *coup de grace*."[2]

The fact that the Soviets usually pursue their aims with caution is at least as important in its implications for the West as the fact that these aims are unlimited. It means in effect that the pursuit of ultimate goals is circumscribed in time and scope by consideration of feasibility. Estimations of feasibility, of course, may be wrong, as in the Korean War and the Cuban crisis of 1962, but for the most part they have not been wrong, and when the West has acted with both patience and firmness, it has usually been rewarded by Soviet prudence.

This is an excerpt from the first of Senator Fulbright's three Clayton Lectures (April 29-30 and May 1) at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, a graduate school of international affairs administered by Tufts University in cooperation with Harvard University at Medford, Massachusetts. It is printed by permission. The full text of Senator Fulbright's lectures is being published this month by Harvard University Press under the title "Prospects for the West."

[1] Edward Gibbon, "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire."
[2] "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July, 1947.

← **Gourdes, Southern France, *by Paul Child***

Neither Stalin nor his successors have exhibited anything like the suicidal mania of Hitler's Germany, a fact which in certain respects is reassuring to the West but which in other respects makes the Soviet Union a far more formidable antagonist than was Nazi Germany. The distinction was explained by Stalin himself, who, in a conversation with Anthony Eden in December, 1941, commented that Hitler was a very able man whose one mistake was that he did not know when to stop. Eden reacted with amused skepticism and Stalin said: "You are smiling and I know why you're smiling. You think that if we are victorious I shall not know when to stop. You are wrong. I shall know!"[3]

The implication of this for the West, I think, is that while the Russians are unlikely to plunge the world into nuclear war so long as their leadership retains the capacity for rational calculation which it has thus far displayed, neither are they likely to commit fatal blunders of judgment which will lead to their defeat and destruction. It is in this respect that the Soviet Union is an immediately less dangerous but ultimately more formidable adversary for the West than was Nazi Germany.

It is scarcely productive, under these circumstances, for the free world to try to shape its policies on the basis of recondite speculations about the ultimate goals of the Soviet leaders. It is far more rewarding for the West, however hard it may be on the nerves, to continue to concentrate its energies on making communist expansion unfeasible and on multiplying the conditions in which the Soviet Union will be compelled to play the game of international relations by the traditional rules. How they square the necessity to adjust to political realities with their Marxian conscience is their affair, not ours.

Patience, circumspection, and flexibility are qualities which are not at all incompatible with communist ideology or with the Russian temperament. Russian leaders, both tsarist and Bolshevik, have never had compunctions about retreating in the face of superior force. The "creative myth of Leninism," as Sorel termed it, is a messianic ideology but not one which is under the compulsion of a time-table. There is no Freudian "death-wish" either in the Russian mind or in Communist ideology. When confronted with superior force, the Soviets, like their tsarist predecessors, have retreated in good order, rebuilt their forces, and awaited favorable opportunities to restore their fortunes. This cautious instinct is reinforced by both the theory and practice of Soviet communism. Examples of this propensity come readily to mind: Lenin's "New Economic Policy" of the 1920's which was in fact a retreat from initial and unsuccessful experiments with communism; Stalin's policy in the interwar years of "socialism in one country" and his abandonment in the early postwar years, in the face of Western resolve, of Soviet incursions on Iran and Greece; and, more recently Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence" coming in the wake of the failure of Stalin's more direct and brutal methods.

Soviet tactical flexibility is thus a highly relevant factor for the West in the shaping of its own policies, but it must never be forgotten that the complement of restraint is an unerring opportunism, a constant probing for opportunities to expand Soviet power wherever it can be done without excessive risk. The invasion of South Korea in 1950 is, of course, the classic example of Soviet boldness in a situation in which the West permitted its own intentions to be misinterpreted. In other instances, notably the continuing Soviet pressure on Berlin, Western determination and clarity as to its intentions have been rewarded by Soviet prudence. The lesson of Korea and Berlin, and of Cuba as well, is that the West can count upon Soviet moderation and restraint to the extent, and only to the extent, that it is absolutely clear in keeping the Soviets informed about where caution must be observed. This in turn requires Western leaders to be absolutely clear in their own minds as to the boundaries of Western interests.

Underlying the vagaries and circumlocutions of Soviet policy is a profound hostility to the West which must also be a factor in our policy calculations. Soviet hostility to the West is not primarily a product of fear and resentment of Western attitudes toward communism. It is rooted more in theory than experience and is directed less at the behavior of Western countries than at the nature of their society. This cannot be equated with Western fear and dislike of Soviet communism which is essentially a reaction to Soviet behavior and Soviet aims. "In thirty years' experience with Soviet official literature," writes George Kennan, "I cannot recall an instance of a non-Communist government being credited with a single generous or worthy impulse."[4]

Though fundamentally different in motive and nature, Russian hostility to the West and Western hostility to Russia nonetheless feed upon each other, generating distortions of view on both sides. The Soviets, and we, to a lesser extent, suffer in viewing each other from the misrepresentations of a "mirror image," as one psychologist has put it, a

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"You must realize, of course, that I don't speak for everybody in the United States."

[3]From David J. Dallin's "Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin."
[4]George Kennan, "Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin."
[5]Urie Bronfenbrenner, "America's Most Dangerous Prejudice."

"discrepancy between the real and the perceived."[5] It is not that the popular American view of the Soviet Union is false but that it is at least to some degree and in some instances a distortion or exaggeration of the truth. Perceiving the outside world through the prism of our own moral values, we Americans are inclined to interpret our perceptions of the outside world in terms of absolute good and absolute evil, rejecting the ambiguities and uncertainties that somehow make us uncomfortable. The Soviets in turn, indoctrinated with a primitive "demon" theory of capitalist societies, perceive the West through a prism of fear, suspicion, and theoretical delusion.

The conditions and character of the Soviet-Western dialogue have tended over the years to reinforce the "mirror image" between the two societies. The missionary and crusading spirit of conflicting ideologies has injected itself into diplomacy, displacing the traditional methods of quiet and courteous exchange with a new vocabulary of epithets and accusations, publicly exchanged. Under these conditions, diplomacy ceases to be a morally neutral method for conducting business and becomes itself a weapon of ideological conflict. Compromise and accommodation, the virtues of the old diplomacy, become reprehensible, and even treasonable, under the new diplomacy.

Confronting each other in full public view, both Soviet and Western statesmen have all too often used the negotiating forum to address not each other but their own national constituencies and the larger constituency of world public opinion. This makes for excellent propaganda but has not proven conspicuously productive of agreements on outstanding issues. Subjected to the transitory pressures of public emotion, the diplomat is under the strongest pressure to strike postures rather than bargains, to reinforce the prejudices and preconceptions of the "mirror image." Or if there is strong public pressure for some kind of agreement or "success," the negotiator is likely to take refuge in imprecision, coming to an ostensible agreement that obscures but does not resolve existing differences. There comes to mind, in this connection, the ephemeral agreements with the Russians in the 1950's—the "spirit of Geneva" which ended with the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution and the "spirit of Camp David" which ended with the U-2 affair.

The nuclear test ban negotiations in Geneva afford a striking example of the mischief wrought by excessive publicity and political comment on the day-to-day conduct of negotiations. The question of how many inspections a year will provide adequate guarantees against cheating is not a political one but a technical one requiring highly sophisticated scientific evaluation. It is, therefore, difficult to understand how many Americans, including members of Congress, who do not claim expert knowledge in this field, have come to hold such fervent opinions on the appropriate number of inspections. Some of these critics accuse our negotiators of "surrendering to communism" if they make concessions to the Soviet position while others charge them with "being against peace" if they do not. Such uninformed criticism contributes nothing to the search for a workable agreement; on the contrary, it impedes the effort by subjecting our negotiators to political pressures that have little if any relevance to the task at hand.

I believe that the prospects for success in these negotiations would be enhanced if they were removed from the arena of cold war invective and entrusted to quiet and confidential negotiation by professional diplomats. The time for public debate will come after, and not before, an accord has been reached, at which time a basic policy decision will have to be made, not by diplomats but by the elected representatives of the people.

Unlike the test ban negotiations, for which there seems to be at least a possibility of success, the discussion of "general and complete disarmament" is, in my opinion, an exercise in cold war fantasy, a manifestation of the deception and pretense of the new diplomacy. In a world profoundly divided by ideological conflict and national rivalries—conditions which are almost certain to prevail for the foreseeable future—it is inconceivable that the world's foremost antagonists could suddenly and miraculously dispel their animosities and vest in each other the profound trust and confidence which "general and complete disarmament" would require. There is nothing but mischief in negotiations which no statesman seriously expects to succeed. They become a forum for the generation of false hopes and profound disappointments, a cold war battleground for the exchange of epithets and accusations of bad faith in the face of certain failure. The net result is to reinforce the "mirror image" of mistrust and animosity through which the two societies see each other.

The dangers of the "mirror image" are obvious. It poses an artificial barrier to communication and negotiation and in so doing exacerbates tensions and animosities. If we are to cope successfully with the Soviet challenge to the Western world, we must see the Soviets as they are, no better and no worse. I do not think that this is simply a problem of resolving "misunderstandings." I am quite sure that even the most accurate and unemotional perceptions of the Soviet Union will still reveal a great nation dedicated to the imposition on an unwilling world of its own form of totalitarian society.

It is all the more essential, under these circumstances, that we develop widening channels of communication, of cultural and educational exchange, between the two societies. Man, even communist man, is not a completely irrational animal, and if exposed with sufficient frequency and intensity to realities which do not fit the mold of his predilections and prejudices, one can at least hope that in time he will begin to question them. If we can somehow in the years to come contain the passions and animosities that threaten the world with catastrophe, it is at least possible that the cumulative impact of the real world of experience on the imaginary world of Marxian dogma will gradually bring about profound changes in the latter.

J. William Fulbright, Democratic Senator from Arkansas, was elected to the House of Representatives in 1942 and soon became a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. In 1944 he was elected to the Senate and, after serving as chairman of the Banking and Currency Committee, became chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. His article will be concluded in the next issue.

CONCLUSIONS:

THERE CAN be no question but that the present size and complexity of the governmental apparatus are in part a response to real requirements, and thus in part unavoidable. There has been a considerable real increase in function. There can, of course, be no total return to the past. What has been written above should not be taken as in any way a denial of this fact.

A distinction must be drawn, furthermore, between essentially mechanical processes, such as the issuance of passports, where staff can be and must be expanded to meet whatever the requirements may be, and purely intellectual processes, where bigness runs into the law of diminishing returns. Even here, there is an important distinction to be observed between the process of intelligence gathering and initial analysis, on the one hand, and the synthesis and final utilization of intelligence, on the other. For the first, large-scale organization is unquestionably essential; and it must admittedly draw on a large variety of technical skills and specialties. For the second, compactness and intimacy of association are necessary.

The problem narrows down, therefore, to the essentially intellectual processes of synthesis and evaluation of information available to the government and of the formulation and execution of high policy. And the question which it is intended to raise in this paper is whether, for these processes, the massive organization can be useful at all—whether, in fact, the attempt to solve problems in this field by large-scale organization does not rest on certain basic misunderstandings as to what can and cannot be accomplished by the working together of many people.

One would not have to go far to seek the origins of these misunderstandings. The past quarter of a century has seen the gradual and eventually overwhelming rejection by official Washington of the very concept of the diplomatic professional as a source of guidance for the organization of this work. The present pattern of organization is largely the work of wartime administrators, using ideas borrowed from the armed forces or from business—in both of which fields the processes involved are largely mechanical rather than intellectual, and ones in which there is room, or appears to be room, for utilization of great numbers of people, selected solely on the basis of technical qualification, without much relation to their general qualities as human beings. I say "appears to be room," because I do not know whether here, too, this principle is not actually subject to limitations not readily visible to the outsider.

The evils of our present system for conducting external relations could be mitigated, if not entirely eliminated, by remedial measures taken just within the foreign affairs sector of government. A beginning could be made by the concentration in the hands of the Secretary of State of the authority (under the President's direction) for the entire foreign affairs field, subordinating to him all civilian activity relating primarily to external affairs. There could then be a much clearer and firmer allotment of responsibility and power right down the line, involving abandonment of the present negative-veto committee system, and a systematic assignment of individual operational authority, if necessary on an arbitrary basis, where specific questions bridge existing competencies. Personnel and security control could be restored to the normal chain of command—which would not mean that specialists would not be needed or that there would not be centralized, functional record-keeping procedures, but would mean that these services would be used as adjuncts to the normal discipline of the work, not as competing empires. The foreign affairs work could be removed from the general Civil Service administration and organized, once more, in accordance with its own specific requirements. An end could be put to the effort to base a professional foreign affairs service—in the name of democracy—on educational and personal mediocrity; and a beginning could be made once more at the creation (it would take at least two decades to complete) of a professional service commensurate in quality with the tasks to be performed. All these things would help—though none would fully overcome the effect of contagion from the official environment in which this branch of the government has to exist.

Actually, it would be the height of irrealism to suppose that any of these measures will be—or could be—taken in the intellectual and official climate of the present epoch. For this, the misunderstandings are too deep, too ubiquitous, and too dearly held; in many instances the formal commitment to contrary courses has already been made; the vested interest in what now exists is far too great to permit of serious preoccupation with what ought to be. In the governmental machinery of the present day the American people have a commitment of relentless finality. No deliberate human hand will now dismantle it or reduce it to healthier dimensions. Only some form of catastrophe—natural disaster, financial collapse, or the atomic bomb—could have this effect.

THE foreign affairs sector of government will remain, then, for the foreseeable future, substantially what it is today. Of itself, it will tend to continue even to grow; for there will be continued growth in the functions to which it must address itself, and beyond this it will continue to breed activity internally, according to its own peculiar laws. This growth will find its limits, at any given time, in the readiness of Congress to provide funds. But regardless of what motions of investigation the Congress may go through, its final decisions will not be based on any real effort at exact measurement of what is required to meet the demands in question. For this, the organization is already too vast, too impenetrable, too inscrutable; it is no less baffling to Congress than to anyone else. What is appropriated will represent, in the last analysis, a combination of what the Congressmen have become accustomed to and what they feel they can provide in the face of competing demands. And the final product will continue, if past experience is any criterion, to grow greatly in times of crisis and to hold on to the bulk of its gains in the periods between.

This being the case, we must expect that the regular apparatus of the government will become, with time, of less and less value to the President and the Secretary of State as a source of intimate guidance and as a vehicle for the promulgation of policy in really delicate, important, and urgent situations. Increasingly, in situations of this sort, American statesmen will have to take refuge in a bypassing of the regular machinery and in the creation of ad hoc devices—kitchen cabinets, personal envoys, foreign offices within foreign offices, and personal diplomacy—to assure

America's Administrative Response

by George F. Kennan

the intimacy of association, the speed, the privacy, and the expression of personal style essential to any effective diplomacy. This will always be in some degree demoralizing to the regular echelons of government, but not too much so. Many of the values of the regular apparatus are self-engendered in any case, and are already separated from the reality of decision taking by distances so great that a bit more or less makes little difference.

Both government and high policy will go on, then, much as they have in the past, but with a tendency toward increasing separation. Presidents, for want of suitable institutionalized assistance, will continue to improvise—some well, some less so. The muscle-bound bureaucracy will do its chores, some of which are important. It will continue to wage the endless exhausting encounter with itself which is implicit in its overintricate structure. Beyond this, it will continue to be what it has been in these past years; a unique educational institution, second to none in its pedagogical effect—a place where, through the course of many frustrations and bewilderments, just close enough to responsibility to feel its bite and just far enough from it to be safe from real harm, many men may learn many things. They learn about world affairs, about how people are governed, about how people's interests can be represented, and about how the human animal behaves in the political context. A few of them also learn something of the evils of large institutions as instruments of analysis, judgment, and discriminating execution in the field of foreign policy. Perhaps some day the number of those who learn this last lesson will grow to a point where they will rebel successfully against the jungle of superfluous relationships in which they are now confined.

"Country Team"

by Frank Wright



Village Intersection, Mykonos

by Daniel Lee McCarthy

EDITORIAL

Beyond The Call Of Duty

It isn't often that we get an opportunity to submit a performance rating on the Secretary of State. But there was a quality about Secretary Rusk's recent testimony on civil rights before the Senate Committee on Commerce which came through clearly in the television reportage and which we thought it well to impart to our readers, especially those overseas, who were not within camera range.

It was certainly within the scope of the Secretary's responsibilities to point out that the failure of the United States to live up in practice to what it preaches in its Constitution and Declaration of Independence is exploited by the communists in their attempts to belittle the U. S. claim to leadership of the Free World. It was also most appropriate for the Secretary to reveal how difficult it is to carry on correct diplomatic relations with representatives of other countries whose color subjects them to the kind of discrimination and injury to their personal dignity which some people in this country still practice toward more than ten percent of the United States citizenry. These observations, and the difficulties that derive therefrom in the conduct of our foreign policy, were in the line of duty for the Secretary to point out.

But there were other passages which revealed his deep personal feeling on this issue of discrimination. Perhaps it was not accidental that in the following passage the Secretary lapsed into the first person:

"But I would state as emphatically as I can that I do not ask for them (the foreign diplomats) rights and decencies which are in practice denied to colored American citizens. One should not need a diplomatic passport in order to enjoy ordinary civil and human rights. Nor would these diplomats and other visitors be favorably impressed by efforts on our part to treat them differently from non-white Americans. They realize full well that they are being discriminated against, not as diplomats or as foreigners, but on account of their race."

Then, quite deliberately, he committed the Department and the Foreign Service in the following passage:

"So, let me stress again, the interest of the Department of State in this bill reaches far beyond obtaining decent treatment for non-white diplomats and visitors. We are directly and comprehensively concerned with obtaining decent treatment for all human beings, including American citizens."

During the questioning period one of the southern Senators tried to pin down the Secretary as to whether he favored the civil rights demonstrations—a kind of "have you stopped beating your wife" question. The Secretary skillfully avoided the trap. He said he would not wish to make a blanket statement about the demonstrations and added: "But I would say this, Sir. If I were denied what our Negro citizens are denied, I would demonstrate." He thus identified his interests with those of the Negro.

This attitude goes to the heart of the problem. Despite the decisions of the courts, the decrees of the Executive Branch, and even eventual laws by Congress, the only permanent solution to this issue lies in the attitude of the individual to his fellow man. All of us in the Service who deal constantly and intimately with people of all races and colors might well think of these things.

◆◆◆ "America's experiment with government of the people, by the people, and for the people depends not only on constitutional structure and organization but also on the commitment, person to person, that we make to each other."

OVERSEAS LETTER

by TED OLSON

This month we're delighted to publish an Overseas Letter, in place of the usual Washington Letter. JOURNAL readers will recall its author wrote us a memorable piece from Greece, "They Always Come on Sunday"—even before Melina Mercouri sang about Sunday visitors. Ted Olson is again sitting in for us while we go on leave.

Gwen Barrows

To judge by the accents one overheard at the GB bar in Athens, in the Piazza San Marco, in Copenhagen's Tivoli (and what a shock it is for an American to be reminded that he speaks with an accent), there were a lot of other people contributing to our balance of payments deficit last summer and not visibly conscience-stricken about it. Any nascent twinge of conscience was quickly anesthetized by mail from home, which dealt mostly with the weather. It was a wonderful summer for anybody who had the foresight not to spend it on the eastern seaboard of the North American continent.

Whether or not this mass defection seriously augmented the gold leakage from Fort Knox, one thing is sure: it kept our Protection and Welfare people hustling. One post reported business up fifty per cent in the last six months—naturally with no increase in personnel to handle the business. The peak load falls, moreover, just when staffs are likely to be depleted by local leave.

Nobody questions the right of an American citizen to holler for help when he gets into serious trouble abroad, or the obligation of the nearest Embassy or Consulate to lope to the rescue. But some of the requests made by the contemporary generation of tourists seem a bit frivolous.

There was the lady in Cairo, for instance, who was going straight to the Ambassador to demand that he do something about the price of Kleenex on the local market. Seventy-five cents! Outrageous! It was clear that she expected him, if a *démarche* to the Foreign Office proved ineffectual, to whistle up the Sixth Fleet. It took all the suasive powers of a wiser tourist, a California attorney who told us the story, to convince her that just possibly the Ambassador had more important chores to look after.

Hers probably was an extreme case. (If any consular officer can match or top it, write us a letter.) But there does seem to be an increasing tendency to confuse the functions of an American mission abroad with those of Thos. Cook & Sons. Out of a pending stack four inches high the Consular Section in Oslo pulled a sample request: A Ph.D. coming to Norway for a year of research wanted the Embassy to find him a small house or apartment, furnished. He would drop in on his arrival to see what had been lined up for him. He got a form reply—one of a number Oslo, like other missions, has had to prepare—regretting that the Embassy wasn't equipped to find people houses. Neither does it arrange sightseeing tours, hire maids, or provide baby-sitters.

Why this dependence on official hand-holding — flattering, perhaps, but embarrassing? One can only speculate. The emergence of a new class of tourists, less affluent and assured than the pre-war and between-the-wars generations? The poison of the Welfare State, eating away the pith of American self-reliance, as the Radical Right doubtless would argue? Have travelers, reminded so often that in foreign lands they must consider themselves their country's ambassadors, come to assume that they are therefore entitled to all the services and amenities enjoyed by a genuine A.E. and P.

Or is it just the greater accessibility of our diplomatic-consular establishments? In the old days, before FBO got almost as busy as Conrad Hilton, you had to hunt through back streets and climb murky stairways to find your country's official representatives. Now you can't miss 'em. The American Embassy or Consulate General is likely to occupy one of the newest and handsomest buildings in town—and that, in a Europe pushing outward and skyward at fantastic speed, is saying a lot. No wonder the homesick American beats a path to the door.

We can be grateful that there is more general awareness of the existence of an American Foreign Service than there was a decade ago. But something remains to be done in explaining what it's there for — and isn't. Maybe Horace Sutton, or some other travel columnist, could help.

* * * Question for the sociologists: Why do most of our migrant beatniks gravitate to Naples? Or is that only an assumption of AmConGen Naples, which other posts will challenge? The P & W officer there groaned: "Whenever somebody with a beard and sandals comes in the receptionist doesn't even ask what he wants; she just sends him up to me."

ONE'S first impression may be that American tourists are all over the place, but they aren't. The herd instinct is strong—as with other nationalities. Kitzbühel swarms with our countrymen; Mayrhofen, not so many kilometers southwestward, rarely sees one. When you mention the Dolomites most people think of Cortina d'Ampezzo; they may whisk through places like Ortisei on the circle tour but they rarely stop over. If you want to be alone, you still can be.

But don't expect to find a drinkable martini or an American newspaper. The international editions of the TIMES and the HERALD TRIBUNE are wonderful institutions, but the British papers, like their readers, seem to get deeper into the nooks and crannies. So a traveler who wandered off the beaten track last summer is likely to be thoroughly briefed on the life and times of Christine Keeler, but may be a little uncertain as to what was happening on Capitol Hill.

As for the vernacular press—well, Birmingham and the other battlefronts of the civil rights struggle got

into print practically everywhere, but not so conspicuously as one might have feared. We tend to forget that other countries have their troubles too—sometimes so preoccupying that people neglect to wag their fingers at us.

THIS was the year of cabinet crises in Europe. Maybe it was coincidence, maybe contagion, maybe some as yet unisolated virus like that of Asian flu. Anyway, one government after another toppled, or wobbled vertiginously before regaining equilibrium.

Nothing could have looked more stable and flourishing than Italy in mid-April, with TV antennae on nearly every housetop, transistor radios clutched to every promenader's ear, and the Fiats exuberantly playing chicken at every intersection. And two weeks later came that election. In Greece, Prime Minister Karamanlis was starting his eighth year in office, a record unprecedented in modern history; a month afterward he was out. In Austria, the coalition that had governed since the end of the war splintered on a reef thrusting up anachronistically from the engulfing tides of history—the name Hapsburg. In Denmark, the electorate jolted the Social Democratic administration by summarily rejecting its land reform proposals. In Norway, twenty-eight years of Labor government ended and a non-Socialist coalition took over on a vote of no-confidence in the Cabinet's handling of a mine disaster.

Maybe it was just coincidence. But to one traveler—well, let's come right out and admit that it was your correspondent—it began to look a little eerie. His leisurely, often unpremeditated progress across the map of Europe was accompanied or followed by the creak and crack of governments coming apart at the joints. Italy—Greece—Austria—Denmark—Norway: the sequence and the timing duplicated his itinerary with disquieting fidelity.

Post hoc, ergo propter hoc is, of course, poor logic. It was all, no doubt, sheer coincidence. But the sense of disquiet persists. Could there, just possibly, just by the remotest flicker or possibility, be something in that idea of contagion? We know really very little about political forces. Could there conceivably be a virus, as yet unsuspected by science, that eats away the cement of political structures?

And if there should be such a virus, might there not be carriers—innocent agents of pestilence, like Typhoid Mary?

A plot for the producers of "The Twilight Zone," perhaps, and no more. But if, in this age of the incredible become commonplace, that remotest flicker of possibility is considered worth exploring, your correspondent is willing to cooperate. Just tell him where to go, give him a book of TR's, and he will be glad to see what he can do. Have germ, will travel.

REVISITING a post where you once served provides a reminder of something that probably doesn't need restating but can bear emphasis: It's the FSL's, at their desks year in and out, often decade after decade, who give our operations continuity and a fund of expertise we could not do without. Five or ten years after your lift vans moved off, it is only luck if you encounter a familiar American face in the chancery corridors—a face last met, perhaps, in Foggy Bottom, or San Salvador, or Reykjavik. But there are plenty of other familiar faces, and a succession of pleasant reunions, because somehow these "locals," who see generation after generation of Americans come and go, seem to remember the units in that unceasing procession. They even remember your name, though you may fumble embarrassedly for theirs.

Every now and then some junketeer gets worried about the security risk involved in having all these "foreigners" working in our missions. Fire 'em, he urges, and bring in Americans to do the work. (The proposal never survives a rough projection of the cost.) Security risk? Nonsense. There are no more loyal employees anywhere than the great majority of these locals (there ought to be a less condescending word for them). There are none who better merit that tattered accolade "dedicated."

And how proudly they display any evidence of appreciation—the ten-year or twenty-year service pin, the photograph of the Ambassador presenting it!

Even more welcome recognition, doubtless, would be hard cash; many of the veterans are bumping the grade and salary ceiling. But there are ways of showing appreciation that cost little or nothing: inclusion in a cocktail party, for instance. The important thing is to make them feel that they are members of the family, not just hired hands.

"They've seen the White House Tour—they want 'Lawrence . . .'"

Selective Readings

by MARTIN F. HERZ

DURING the past year I had the opportunity to do more than the usual amount of reading, having been assigned to the relatively contemplative life of the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy. As I read or reread certain books (not all of them on the Seminar's reading list), it occurred to me that it might be of general interest to point out some chapters that had struck me as especially thought-provoking.

"Flashes of insight" to one reader seem but commonplaces or platitudes to another. It cannot be guaranteed, therefore, that all the selected readings discussed below will be for others particularly revealing; but it can be guaranteed that looking them up will not take very much time—and there's a good chance that they will strike a spark.

Political Philosophy

Who should rule? Whose will should be supreme? The best? The wisest? The general will? The Master Race? The industrial workers? Or the people? This question, which was first raised by Plato, is perplexing principally because it is wrongly phrased, says Karl R. Popper in *The Open Society and Its Enemies*,* Chapter VII. The question "who should rule?" should be replaced by the new question: "How can we so organize political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from doing too much damage?"

This defense, or explanation, of democracy is an unusually eloquent, sparkling and thought-provoking chapter in an otherwise rather heavy book by a philosopher whose other works ("The Logic of Scientific Discovery" and "The Poverty of Historicism") are a bit afield from our interests. But I found Chapter VII, and also Chapter XI of his "Open Society" to be a veritable intellectual arsenal in the controversy between democracy and doctrinaire Marxism.

History

Not everyone has time to reread Thucydides, but everyone can find time to reread the article "A Message from Thucydides" by Louis J. Halle which appeared in the JOURNAL of August, 1952. It now appears as the appendix to his book, *Civilization and Foreign Policy*. On the other hand, if you have a little more time, you might go to the original and read Chapters IX, X, XVI and XVII of *The Pelopponesian War*. The time will be well spent. Here is the debate between Diodotus and the demagogue Cleon which illustrates the deterioration of the political decision-making process in Athens; the problem of the neutrality of Thebes; the break-up of the alliance; and the ill-advised destruction of Melos. The story seems full of meaning, and each of the selected chapters reads like a thriller.

To see a Marxist brilliantly refute the Marxist interpretation of history is in itself noteworthy; but Sidney Hook's *The Hero in History* uses Russian history and historiography as the text. He does not deny, indeed he affirms, the importance of the economic factor, but he also demonstrates (Chapter IX) the importance of the "event-making man" as distinguished from the mere "eventful man." In Chapter VIII, entitled "The Contingent and the Unforeseen" he discusses, in historical terms, the kinds of things that concern the policy-planner in the political field, including the consequences of the "lost chance" in terms of narrowed (but not necessarily changed) alternatives for the future. Hook's concept of the "tree of history" (in Chapter VII) is a wonderfully illuminating simile to show the interaction between trend and event-making.

And while we are discussing history, two chapters of George Kennan's book, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950,* are perhaps most useful and interesting to reread: Written at a time when he was in opposition to many features of our diplomacy, the latter chapter contains some general criticisms of our diplomatic style which are, surprisingly, as applicable today as they were then. Indeed, Kennan raises the question whether our problem of conducting a more effective diplomacy can be solved without constitutional reform.

Government

No one who is engaged in the conduct of foreign relations can help being stirred by Chapter V of Walter Lippmann's *The Public Philosophy* which discusses the legitimate functions of the Executive, their protection, the Executive's relationship to the voters, and what Lippmann calls the "enfeebled Executive" resulting from the doctrine that the Executive is the direct agent of the people. Lippmann holds that although public officials are elected by the voters, or are appointed by men who are elected, "they owe their primary allegiance not to the opinions of the voters but to the law, to the criteria of their professions, to the integrity of the arts and sciences in which they work, to their own conscientious and responsible convictions of their duty within the rules and the frame of reference they have sworn to respect."

Lippmann's book is—as usual with him—long on diagnosis and a bit short on therapy, so it may be helpful to go back for a brief visit with the Founding Fathers for further enlightenment on the vital question he has raised. I found a rereading of Hamilton's *Federalist No. 71* especially interesting as it deals with the danger of "servile pliancy of the Executive to the prevailing current" and makes recommendations on how best to deal with demagoguery ("the wiles of parasites and sycophants, the snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate, the artifices of men who possess the people's confidence more than they deserve it, and those who seek to possess rather than deserve it.") This kind of refreshing of our historical roots is sometimes not only necessary but delightful.

On a more contemporary plane, Ted White's *The Making of the President 1960* furnishes a number of interesting insights into the workings of our democracy. Perhaps the most interesting is found in Chapter XIII describing the last round of the electoral battle when a handful of events contributed importantly to John F. Kennedy's election. Not least of these was the effect

*Full titles of the books cited herein will be found at the end of the article.

of the Martin Luther King episode, and Kennedy's handling of it, on the Negro electorate. In reading this chapter one wonders if one man's suggestion, quickly taken up by his superior who urged it on the candidate, might not have been decisive in the election. But this is the kind of hypothetical question of which Hook and Popper would probably disapprove.

Military Matters

There are a few "must" books in this category, but not being an expert I shall not try to list them here. I found rereading Chapter XIX of *War or Peace* by John Foster Dulles most interesting. It is entitled "The Role of the Military" and discusses the striking of a proper balance between military and political factors. Give it to someone to read and ask him to guess the author. Few will win this test. For the layman, there is also much meat in Chapters XXI and XXII of B. H. Liddell Hart's *Strategy* entitled, respectively, "National Object and Military Aims" and "Grand Strategy," illuminating the concept of the indirect approach. A lot of this seems nowadays more applicable to political than to military prohlems—which is a good reason for us to expose ourselves to it.

In the counter-guerrilla field, the conscientious reader of the plethora of available materials will soon have generalities and platitudes coming out of his ears. One very practical and concrete study is Lucian W. Pye's *Guerrilla Communism in Malaya* which in Chapter XIV discusses "The Process of Disaffection" of a sample of Malayan Chinese guerrillas who had surrendered. Pye details the psychological factors—surprisingly unrelated to the vagaries of the communist line—which made guerrillas decide to quit: requirements of status and hierarchy, "sacrificing oneself for a losing cause," sex, "corruption" in the party, etc. Here is, for once, a three-dimensional picture of some psychological aspects of counter-guerrilla warfare.

The demonologists of nuclear weaponry have of course their favorites, and anyone seriously delving into this field must read Brodie, Kissinger and Schelling. But I also found very interesting a little book entitled *Limited Strategic War* which starts from the unusual assumption that the employment of strategic weapons—this means not tactical "nukes" but the really big ones—*may* be "deliberately and voluntarily limited in the total amount of damage threatened, planned, and done, as well as in the kinds of targets attacked." The introductory chapter, by Klaus Knorr, explains the strange world which the authors explore. Perhaps one should hope that the Russians will undertake similar intellectual explorations.

(To be continued in an early issue)

Books discussed in this article:

Karl R. Popper, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES. Princeton, 1950 (Chapters 7, 19).

Louis J. Halle, CIVILIZATION AND FOREIGN POLICY, Harper, 1955 (Appendix).

Thucydides, THE PELOPPONESIAN WAR, Modern Library, vol. 58 (Chs. IX, X, XVI, XVII).

Sidney Hook, THE HERO IN HISTORY, Beacon Books (paperback) (Chs. VII, VIII, IX).

George F. Kennan, AMERICAN DIPLOMAOY, 1900-1950, University of Chicago Press, 1957 (Chs. V and VII).

Walter Lippmann, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY Mentor Books (paperback) (Chapter V).

THE FEDERALIST, Modern Library, vol. 139 (Federalist 71).

Theodore H. White, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1960, Pocket Books (paperback) (Chapter 13).

John Foster Dulles, WAR OR PEACE, Macmillan, 1950 (Chapter 19).

B. H. Liddell Hart, STRATEGY, Praeger Paperbacks, 1954 (Chapters XXI and XXII).

Lucian W. Pye, GUERRILLA COMMUNISM IN MALAYA, Princeton, 1956 (Chapter 14).

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

THE BOOKSHELF:

The Eleventh Hour

MR. MACEOIN has an excellent background for his subject, having been editor of LA PRENSA of New York and later of LA HACIENDA. He has amassed an impressive array of facts and figures to back up his choice of title and his second chapter, "The Have Nots," is a depressing account of the depth of the problem facing the Alliance for Progress. As the title suggests, time is running out. "People are not willing to wait indefinitely," he says; "their own misery can appear only as a gratuitous insult and outrage."

The author devotes three chapters to studies of social revolutions in Latin America: successful in Mexico, abortive in Bolivia, and perverted in Cuba.

His treatment of Mexico, on the whole, is objective and accurate, although one might take some issue with his interpretation of the role and position of the Church, particularly if one has been exposed to Senator Gruening's historic study of this aspect of Mexican life. His study of Cuba offers little new on a matter already the subject of a surfeit of studies, even prior to the missile crisis.

Mr. MacEoin's chapter on Bolivia is weak and misleading. A fascinating study could have been made of the first decade of the National Revolutionary Movement's efforts to build a new society to replace the feudalism of centuries. There is no question but that the Revolution has been abortive, but to discuss it without referring to the violent death of Villaroel and the establishment of the MNR Government after so many attempts; to speak of the Agrarian Reform as a move by the Government to avert a bloody civil war; is to paint a very misleading picture indeed of the events of April 1952 and the ensuing decade.

The author has a significant chapter on the problems of and the need for foreign capital. His study of the Church in Latin America, both actual and potential, evokes a hope which we can all share, that this great institution, which is not now an effective force, can assume the role which its teachings and the requirements of the times demand.

—TAYLOR G. BELCHER

LATIN AMERICA—THE ELEVENTH HOUR, *by Gary MacEoin. P. J. Kenedy & Sons,* $4.50.

The "Radical Scholar" or the "Man of Affairs"

STUART Hughes' "An Approach to Peace" well illustrates the wrong results which can arise from a purely theoretical approach to present-day problems. His major thesis, that we should make a start on eliminating war by unilateral disarmament, may be logical but it certainly is not practical. Similarly, his chapter on "Gaullism in the Mirror of History" helps us to understand deGaulle but offers no practical way of dealing with him. His discussion of why we had no Dreyfus case throws some interesting light on the role of the intellectual during the McCarthy period and does offer some hints as to what not to do if such an unhappy period should recur.

By contrast, "The Essential Lippmann" illustrates by excellent selection the practical scholarly approach to the public issues of today. Lippmann's own comment, made in 1932, on the role of the scholar puts the issue succintly:

> The true scholar is always radical. He is prcoccupied with presumptions, with antecedcnts and probabilities; he moves at a level of reality under that of the immediate moment, in a world where the choices are more numerous and the possibilities more varied than they are at the level of practical decisions. . . At the level of thought, in the empire of reason, the choices are wide, because there is no compulsion of events or of self-interest.

Lippmann fully recognizes that each decision in the political realm has its own unique set of practical aspects which must be swiftly and intuitively appraised in order to make decisions both timely and effective. "The art of practical decision, the art of determining which of several ends to pursue, which of many means to employ, when to strike and when to recoil, comes from intuitions that are more unconscious than the analytical judgment. In great emergencies the man of affairs feels his conclusions first, and understands them later. He proceeds by a kind of empathy, relying upon a curious capacity for self-identification with the moods of others and upon a sense of realities which he can rarely expound. Those who have this gift must be immersed in affairs; they must absorb much more than they analyze; they must be subtly sensitive to the atmosphere about them; they must, like a cat, be able to see in the dark."

Each of these books throws interesting light on the business of the Foreign Service even though the contribution of the one is largely of a negative sort.

—E. M. J. K.

AN APPROACH TO PEACE, *by H. Stuart Hughes. Atheneum, $4.50.*

THE ESSENTIAL LIPPMANN, *edited by Clinton Rossiter & James Lare. Random House, $7.50.*

Cultural Self-Consciousness

SINCE World War II Americans have become very culture conscious, not only about the arts at home but also about our cultural prestige abroad and its relation to foreign policy. A growing number of studies reflect this concern. Two of the most recent are the symposium edited by Robert Blum, "Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations" and the study edited by C. A. Thompson (once chief of the Department's Division of Cultural Relations) and Walter H. C. Laves (former Deputy Director General of UNESCO), "Cultural Relations and U. S. Foreign Policy."

The Blum volume contains essays by George Schuster, by Howard E. Wilson, Roger Revelle, and by former Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Philip H. Coombs. The editor contributes a brief introduction, "The Flow of People and Ideas." The Blum symposium has the sound of human voices carrying on intelligent, sometimes lively, conversation. The Thompson-Laves study, the work of two experts with an enormous experience on the policy level, is admirably documented, stresses problems of organization, reads like a particularly well-done official report. The first part, "The Evolution of Cultural Programs," was left in draft by Charles Thompson at the time of his death. Professor Laves wrote the second, "The Role of Cultural Activities," a broad and lucid analysis of their significance and complexity in a time of the emergence fo non-occidental cultures and of the global cultural relativism which accompanies it. Indeed, both these books for the most part reflect an anthropological conception of culture and tend to regard it largely in terms of education, the acquisition of technical skills, scientific advance, the collective society. They remind us once again how anachronistic individual humanism and the selective image of "the cultured man" have become in a world of "Männer ohne Eigenschaften."

—JOHN L. BROWN

CULTURAL AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS. *Edited by Robert Blum. Prentice-Hall,* $1.95.

CULTURAL RELATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. *By C. A. Thompson and Walter H. C. Laves. University of Indiana Press,* $5.95.

A Challenger

IF Professor Paul Seabury's "Power, Freedom, and Diplomacy" is not 1963's best book about American foreign policy, it will take lots of beating for the championship. And it can hold up its head in the proud company of extraordinarily fine works the crisis-ridden years since 1945 have produced.

To try to review it in brief compass is to do it disservice. For it ranges far and wide. A sampling of the chapter headings will give an idea of its reach: "Policy and the National Community;" "The Idea of National Interest;" "Power and Policy;" "Ethics and Policy;" "Policy and Public;" "The Search for a National Interest." But this reach rarely exceeds the author's grasp. He has read widely, and thought deeply; he is as much at home with Aristotle as he is with "Scotty" Reston, and he perceives the link between the two; and, if the detached view he achieves does not often produce the startling, it does the thought-provoking: rare the page that does not persuade the reader to drop the book into his lap and follow down the mental vistas the University of California political scientist opens up.

Moreover, he can write. A spate of brilliant books from American campuses in the postwar years has, it may be hoped, disposed of the canard that good writing and the academic life are antithetic. Professor Seabury's volume —while it glows rather than sparkles —is of their number. Its jacket blurb touts it as a textbook. It deserves a much wider readership. For the "central issue of human survival in freedom" with which it sweepingly deals is truly the central issue of our times.

—JOHN P. MCKNIGHT

POWER, FREEDOM, AND DIPLOMACY, *by Paul Seabury. Random House,* $6.25.

"Rich in Atmosphere"

MR. EAGLETON'S succinct book, published at a particularly timely juncture, fills in with notable detail a hitherto only partially told account of the brief burst of Kurdish nationalism in the Mahabad Kurdish Republic of 1946. Writing while still at his post in Tabriz as American Consul, the author has filled his pages from a wealth of personal experience during his tours of duty at Kirkuk in Iraq and later in Tabriz.

The book recounts the story of a people's grim hopes, captures the personality of a few individuals whose stars rose and fell during that year of crowded events, and exposes the reader to names of others still struggling today for an ill-defined Kurdish peoples entity. Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani, now the famed and hunted chieftain of dissident Iraqi Kurds, was a central character even at that time, as a leader of the Kurdish fighting forces of the Mahabad Republic.

More than an unalloyed folk compulsion for self-rule is recorded, however, particularly the activities of the Soviets in backing and encouraging the secessionist tendencies of the Mahahad-led Kurds and the Tabriz-centered, Turki-speaking Iranian Azerbaijanis.

Mr. Eagleton's careful search for the facts has produced a case study of a misconceived Soviet attempt to use for Soviet purposes the free spirit of a simple but determined and rugged people. That both the Soviets and the Mahabad Kurds failed to achieve their separate goals was merely a prophetic footnote to a post-war generation of ill-formed ethnic "nations," stubbornly resistant to management and control from abroad, but resolute and unyielding in their demands for recognition and self-expression.

FSO Eagleton's 132-page book is rich in the atmosphere of the area and is a convincing step-by-step record of an intense moment of Kurdish history. Recommended reading.

—LEE F. DINSMORE

THE KURDISH REPUBLIC OF 1946, *by William Eagleton, Jr. Oxford University Press,* $4.80.

Politics in Iran

LEONARD BINDER'S enterprising study of the Iranian political system seeks to avoid the clichés and endless repetitions of many general books on the recent history and politics of Iran by first proposing a theoretical framework for the study of the Iranian political system and then filling out details from his own personal observation and research. That he has not been completely successful is certainly as much due to the complexity of his subject as to any inadequacies of his methods.

Relying on historical and sociological approaches, as well as on extensive personal interviews and his own obviously keen powers of observation, Mr. Binder ably describes the key elements of Iranian politics, covering, for example, such topics as the central role of the Shah and his relations with the Army, the traditional elite, and the bureaucracy. His treatment of certain aspects of Iranian society, particularly the relationships within families, the problem of access to those in authority, and the use of bargaining in political, economic, and social affairs, gives a graphic picture of how affairs are conducted in Iran.

Of interest to U.S. policy makers is Mr. Binder's insistence on the term "transitional" to describe Iran's present political condition, from which the country may proceed in several directions, none to be foreseen with any clarity. While he sees and recounts much that is unsatisfactory (in terms of Iran's announced national objectives) in Iranian political institutions, his pessimism is tempered by the belief that stability imposed from above offers some prospect of the "establishment of a government with which Iranians might identify themselves, and social conditions which would encourage all the industriousness and artistic creativity of which Iranians are capable."

—FRANKLIN J. CRAWFORD

IRAN: *Political Development in a Changing Society, by Leonard Binder. University of California Press,* $7.50.

Middle Eastern Oil

THE authors of this 173-page treatise have done a fine job of research on a complex subject. Their conclusion that the operations of the major international oil companies are no longer as profitable as they have been in the past and that the companies are now facing a profit squeeze through declining sales realizations and increased government demands for a higher share of production profits will, no doubt, be well received by the oil companies as confirmation of their own claims.

The first chapter of the book deals with the history of the major concessions of the Middle East and thus covers ground which has been amply traversed in recent years by a number of other works dealing with the subject of Middle Eastern oil. It is nevertheless a necessary preamble to set the remainder of the book in proper prospective.

For the serious student of oil economics the authors have performed a service in their section on the pricing system for crude oil. Some experts may question the authors' conclusion that the rate of growth of demand for petroleum may be declining in view of economies of use of petroleum fuels and competition of alternative energy sources, but the matter is debatable and the authors have been careful to hedge their predictions. In any event, the work is worthwhile reading for those who have more than a passing interest in Middle East petroleum affairs.

—SLATOR C. BLACKISTON, JR.

THE ECONOMICS OF MIDDLE EASTERN OIL, *by Charles Issawi and Mohammed Yeganeh. Praeger,* $8.00.

"A Nation of Lions . . . Chained"

PARTISANSHIP is the rule and scholarly detachment the exception. Dr. Mehdi's book is not one of the exceptions. What does make it worth reading, however, is the fact that he presents the full range of Arab arguments on Palestine, the strong points and the inconsistencies both standing forth clearly. As he states, Americans have the moral obligation to know the Arab side of the Palestine question. He assumes that the Israeli side is already well understood.

—R. C. S.

A NATION OF LIONS . . . CHAINED, *by Dr. Mohammad T. Mehdi. New World Press,* $3.25.

The Arabs and Today's World

"THE ARABS and the World" is truly an essential contribution to understanding a most easily and readily misunderstood people, the Arabs.

Mr. Cremeans' subtitle is "Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy" and the major emphasis is thereon. Additionally, however, the author has drawn on a wealth of personal knowledge and advice from genuine experts to produce a broad, sympathetic, and analytical picture of the Arab world's hopes and fears in the international sphere.

The book suffers—but only slightly—by its having obviously been written prior to the overthrow of Kassim in Iraq and the more recent efforts at the formation of a new United Arab Republic. If anything, however, these events which are not recorded tend to prove something which can be clearly drawn in Mr. Cremeans' work, the predictable unpredictability of the Arabs.

While in part somewhat repetitious and perhaps overly emphasizing the Afro-Asian drive for independence and freedom, this exceedingly well-written book quite clearly sets forth why it may seem "impossible to do business with Nasser" but why we must try. Carefully detailing the recent history of the Arab states and the Arab-Israel conflict, Mr. Cremeans evolves a series of foreign policy alternatives for the United States which some of us may, with a degree of weary satisfaction, view as tending to justify the necessarily pragmatic policy which the United States has been pursuing over the recent years.

If Mr. Cremeans' book is the broad picture, Sylvia Haim's "Arab Nationalism" provides much of the feeling and color which is necessary for the fullest appreciation of what is stirring in the Arab world today. Her book is, as described, an anthology which presents a very detailed introductory analysis of various writers on Arab nationalism. She has then prepared twenty vignettes of the writings and sayings of Arab nationalists, including some of the most recent and most important (i.e., citations from Nasser's "The Philosophy of the Revolution" and "The Constitution of the Arab Ba'th Party"). These selections, compacted as they are into a book of only 250 pages, constitute a very telling picture of the depth of thought, reason, hope, and emotion which too often confuses us, but the appreciation of which is necessary if we are to understand the Arab world and its future.

—JAMES M. LUDLOW

THE ARABS AND THE WORLD, *by Charles D. Cremeans, Praeger.* $6.50.

ARAB NATIONALISM, *Sylvia G. Haim, University of California Press.* $6.00.

Rural Java

THIS is an anthropologist's study in depth of the manner in which marketing practices bind together otherwise isolated communities of rural Java. The study was carried out under the sponsorship of the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. While it makes no pretension to be other than a scholarly work in a narrow field, it contains some interesting and useful background on the social structure of rural Java, using the device of a mythical town and district of "Modjokuto." As the blurb on the jacket says, this volume "fills an important gap in anthropological literature." Most Foreign Service readers will be content to take the publisher's word for it and pass on.

—JOHN W. HENDERSON

PEASANT MARKETING IN JAVA, *by Alice G. Dewey. Free Press of Glencoe, $6.00.*

Mission to Moscow

by WALLACE CARROLL

"RUSSIA," said Winston Churchill with the rumpled perplexity of a man who has been hugged by a bear, "Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma."

The man who represents the United States in this forbidding country must live with the riddle while he seeks to penetrate the mystery and explain the enigma to his uneasy principals at home.

No doubt this was already true enough in 1781 when Francis Dana and his young secretary, John Quincy Adams, arrived at the court of Catherine the Great to seek recognition for the rebellious American colonies.

It is all the more true today when the United States and the Soviet Union confront each other, each armed with the power of bringing about almost instantaneous annihilation.

To this exposed and sensitive post in the summer of 1957 came a new American ambassador. After nearly thirty years on the diplomatic circuit in Asia, Europe and America, Llewellyn Thompson was not entirely a riddle or an enigma to the Soviet officials and the members of the diplomatic corps who welcomed him at the Moscow airport.

In fact, he was known in the trade as a political analyst of exceptional quality, an accurate reporter, and a tireless and resourceful negotiator. In his custody a secret of state was as secure as in Fort Knox. But in the drawing room he had a flow of small talk and patter that he could easily adjust to suit his audience—male or female, undergraduate or septuagenarian, Anglo-Saxon, Latin, or Byzantine. Indeed, Gilbert and Sullivan might have touted him as the very model of a Foreign Service officer.

One thing, however, his fellow diplomats might have overlooked that July day at the airport. Thompson had achieved all this—and a wardrobe out of Savile Row—without ever forfeiting his Colorado birthright. His long lean face, ruddy skin, and clear blue eyes would have looked at home above a cow pony. And for all his long years abroad he had kept certain American qualities—shrewdness and good sense rather than intellectualism, a bent for humor rather than wit, and whatever it is that addicts a man to the peculiarly American game of poker.

The Foreign Service of the United States has never been confused in the popular mind with the Marine Corps. On Capitol Hill in Washington the kindly men who vote its budget sometimes refer to its members as "the striped-pants boys" or "the cookie-pushers."

Thompson was a member of—indeed a product of—this brotherhood. It is possible that at one time or another an outsider had sized him up as one of the striped-pants boys. Yet in five years in Moscow he was to play a cool hand, to uphold the American point of view in argument with the most dangerous man to come on the world scene since the last great war, and to become within a few weeks of his return home the President's most trusted adviser on matters of war or peace with the mysterious Russians.

The Thompsons arrived in Moscow on July 10, 1957. The atmosphere was not promising. The government and people of the United States had not forgotten the brutal suppression of the Hungarian revolution the year before. The Soviets were still denouncing the "Eisenhower Doctrine"—the intention proclaimed by the President to resist any overt Communist aggression in the Middle East.

Both countries were pressing on with their tests of nuclear weapons—a problem that was to give trouble all through Thompson's tour of duty in Moscow. Premier Bulganin and Nikita Khrushchev, the Communist Party secretary, had been threatening the European allies and neutrals with atomic destruction if they allowed the United States to use bases on their soil. The Soviets were also watching uneasily the increasing cohesion of the West: the European Common Market had been born that year and the first three German divisions had been put under NATO command.

In the Soviet Union itself, the aggressive and cunning Khrushchev, who had recently told American newspapermen that their grandchildren would live under socialism, had come out on top in the power struggle that followed Stalin's death. Only a week before Thompson's arrival, the leaders of the "anti-party groups"—Viacheslav Molotov, Georgi Malenkov, Lazar Kaganovitch, and others—had been cast out of the party leadership.

WITH so reticent a man, it is hard to determine exactly what Thompson conceived his mission to be and what he thought he might accomplish. Even after leaving Moscow he was wary about showing his hand, perhaps because he thought he might again be called upon to negotiate with the Soviets in a crisis or at some major turning point.

Certain themes, however, run through the little he has said publicly and privately over the years.

Anything that tends to make Soviet society a more "normal" society, he thinks, is something to be welcomed by the West. In the long run it is good if the standard of living goes up and the terror goes down. A rising standard of living will stimulate the "revolution of rising expectations" that is making itself felt in so many parts of the world. A reduction of the terror will encourage discussion, a more critical view of Soviet institutions, a more widespread awareness of what other countries have that the Soviet Union does not have.

It is also to our advantage, he is convinced, to open as many doors as we can between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. The West has much to gain and little to lose in every kind of exchange—cultural, technical, scientific, or the mere flow of tourists. The exchange pro-

The excerpt above is from "Adventures in Public Service," which is to be published by Vanguard Press in December.

gram that began in 1958 is, he is sure, one of the best things that has ever happened in Soviet-American relations.

"Exchanges of all kinds are extremely helpful," he says. "I know we can't measure the effects, but we will never have a stable basis for our relations until we know each other. Whether we are going to be friends or enemies, it is a good thing to know each other."

This line of thought probably contributed to his certainty that Khrushchev was a man to be cultivated—both by himself as an ambassador and by the leaders of the West. Khrushchev, with his earthy ways, his peasant shrewdness, his political flair, knew what the Soviet people were feeling and thinking, and he knew that their wants and desires could not be eternally suppressed. And Khrushchev, as Thompson saw him, had the stature and the foresight to move—to ease the terror, to open the doors and windows at least a little.

Not that Thompson found Khrushchev less fanatical a Communist than any of the other leaders; he was simply more sensitive to what in other countries is called public opinion, and more of a realist in facing up to what had to be done.

Given the frightful power now held by the United States and the Soviet Union, Thompson believes that it is good to "keep talking." He himself contrived to keep talking to the Soviet leaders even when relations between the two governments were about as bad as could be. Undoubtedly his experience in the Trieste and Austrian settlements led him in this direction.

"Given our different approaches to every sort of question," he says, "enormous misunderstandings are bound to exist. We should constantly try to reduce the misunderstandings by normal diplomatic dialogue."

His belief in the efficacy of talk led him to be more sanguine than many of his colleagues in Washington about meetings with the Soviets.

Whether Thompson ever believed that it might be possible to negotiate a broad settlement of differences with the Soviets cannot be determined. It seems fairly sure, however, that after several years in Moscow he did not believe it was possible to reach *fundamental* agreements with this generation of Soviet leaders — that is, agreements that would mean the abandonment of their urge to remake the world in their own image. On the other hand, the Trieste and Austrian settlements taught him that patience, perseverance, and good timing might bring about agreement on specific issues—say, on Berlin or on nuclear testing.

In the five years of Thompson's tour of duty—a longer period than any American Ambassador before him—the Soviets sent up "Sputnik," the first artificial earth satellite, put a man in orbit, and sent a rocket to the moon.

In those five years Vice-President Nixon made his sensational visit to the Soviet Union and met Khrushchev in the celebrated "kitchen debate" at the American exhibition. This was only one of many trying moments in the visit for the Ambassador, who was Nixon's guide and mentor.

The following year it was Khrushchev's turn to visit America, to travel from coast to coast, to meet President Eisenhower at Camp David. Thompson went along, and again there were moments when the ulcer that has plagued him throughout his career almost laid him low.

Then there was the U-2 incident—the shooting down of an American reconnaissance plane inside the Soviet Union. And for most of the five years there was Berlin, with

Khrushchev demanding that the Western allies get out, and the allies refusing to get out. In most of this fencing and maneuvering Thompson played a part, and toward the end of his tour he was elected to carry on, alone, a continuing probe of Soviet aims and intentions.

Finally, there was Cuba, a growing irritant in Soviet-American relations and one which was to reach the point of crisis when Thompson had moved to an advisory post in Washington.

Perhaps Thompson's most unusual achievement during his Moscow assignment was the relationship he established and maintained with Premier Khrushchev. The Premier, the first Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, and other men prominent in the hierarchy, usually came to the receptions at the different embassies on their national days, as well as to the government receptions in the Kremlin.

Many diplomats swarmed around Khrushchev on these occasions, trying to talk to him or hear what he was saying. Thompson held aloof, especially at the start. After a while, Khrushchev would ask where he was and then cross the room to greet him. The other diplomats would then hold back, giving Thompson a chance to talk privately to Khrushchev. These fortuitous meetings often gave Thompson a hint of the way Soviet policy was moving.

Jane Thompson made her own way with the Soviet leaders. She had acquired a kind of free-style Russian, and she did not shrink from engaging Mikoyan or Khrushchev himself in argument. At times Thompson seemed nervous about her frankness, but the Russians took it well. On several occasions the Khrushchev family entertained the Thompson family in the country and the Premier took the Thompson girls for a sleigh ride. Courtesies such as these and as many opportunities for informal talk had never before been given to a non-Communist diplomat.

This relationship did not occur because Thompson humored Khrushchev. And no critic at home ever accused him of "appeasement." He had his instructions and he carried them out, and usually they were unsatisfactory from the Soviet point of view. But he was able, nevertheless, to do what every diplomat would like to be able to do—establish a line of access to the center of power and keep it open. Even the U-2 incident did not break this line of access.

On May 5, 1960, Thompson went to the Kremlin to observe a meeting of the Supreme Soviet. According to protocol, he should have taken his customary seat in the second box of the hall. However, an attendant insisted that he was to sit in the first box. Suspecting something, he entered the first box but sat in the rear where he could not be seen from the floor.

His instinct was right. In an angry speech Khrushchev denounced the United States for trying to wreck the "summit conference," which was to open in Paris on May 16, by committing "aggressive acts." American aircraft had been flying over the Soviet Union, he said, and on May 1 one of them had actually been shot down over Soviet territory.

In Washington the government had already announced

by Wollace Carroll

that a U-2 high-altitude plane engaged on a "weather mission" in the Middle East had disappeared. Then, following a "cover plan" prepared in advance, it said that if the plane had in fact flown over the Soviet Union, the intrusion must have been accidental.

In Moscow, Thompson had gone that same night to an embassy reception. There he learned from someone that the Soviets had captured an American pilot and were holding him. He hurried back to the American Embassy and sent an urgent message to Washington. But the cover story had already been issued.

On May 7, Khrushchev sprang the trap and exposed the American lie. He announced that the U-2 had been shot down far inside the Soviet Union; that it had carried high-altitude cameras and other equipment for espionage purposes; that the pilot, Francis Gary Powers, had been captured; and that he had freely admitted that he had been on a reconnaissance mission that was to have taken him from Pakistan to Norway, straight across the Soviet Union.

In Washington, two days later, the Secretary of State, Christian Herter, conceded the accuracy of this account. Khrushchev, nevertheless, tried to absolve Eisenhower. He was sure, he said, that the President could not have known about this espionage. But Eisenhower himself on May 11—just five days before the Paris conference—took personal responsibility for the U-2 flights and intimated that Soviet secrecy made them necessary.

In the meantime Thompson had encountered Khrushchev at a reception given by the Czechoslovak Embassy. Contrary to his earlier custom, he went straight to the Premier and greeted him. Khrushchev took him aside and talked of the damage done to Soviet-American relations.

Later, speaking to the crowd of diplomats and officials, Khrushchev bitterly denounced the perfidy of the United States and Norway. But he absolved Thompson and said he was sure the Ambassador did not know about the flights. And, giving a toast, he clinked glasses with Thompson and said: "Here's hoping we never clink anywhere else."

At a Kremlin reception several months later, the Premier showed that the U-2 incident was still on his mind by going back to it in a conversation with the Ambassador and Mrs. Thompson. To make his point he stepped on Thompson's foot and said:

"If I do that to you, I ought to apologize. Your government ought to have apologized."

Thompson replied that the Soviet government kept fleets of trawlers off the American coast and carried on other kinds of espionage. As a crowd began to gather around them Khrushchev said:

"Maybe it was Mrs. Thompson's fault—women are always starting something."

"Yes, it was all my fault," said Mrs. Thompson, "and let's not talk about it any more."

The Premier agreed.

Three or four months before this, on May 16, Khrushchev had confronted Eisenhower at the Paris conference and demanded that the United States condemn and cancel all flights over the Soviet Union and punish the guilty. He also told the President that he would not be permitted to make his scheduled visit to the Soviet Union the following month.

Thompson witnessed this humiliation. It seemed to mean

(Continued an page 56)

Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat

by George Alexander Lensen

Dmitrii Ivanovich Abrikossow was a diplomat of bourgeois origin, a rare phenomenon in Tsarist days. His memoirs comment in a highly personal way on developments in Russia, England, China and Japan from the 1870's until the early 1950's. In them he ridicules monocled burcaucrats and unkempt radicals alike.

A confirmed bachelor, Abrikossow lavished most of his time and affection on his work, notably on the sorting and putting into order of diplomatic archives. This made him exceptionally well informed on Russian foreign policy. At the same time his own lack of family led him to take an unusual interest in the private lives of others. His memoirs thus are packed with comments about well-known historical figures. Although diplomats usually remain diplomatic in their memoirs, when the people they mention are still active in public life, the shattering of Old Russia and its Foreign Service by the revolution freed Abrikossow from such inhibitions. When a Russian Ambassador runs off with a little Lolita or a Grand Duke deprives a subordinate officer of his spouse, he reports it all with evident glee.

Abrikossow recalls in his memoirs, "What I found so fascinating in Asian diplomacy, was that the personality and policy of the representative played a much more important role than in Europe and that the results of one's policy were apparently much quicker. In Europe countless conferences, the intervention of other powers, and instructions from above constantly modified one's policy. Years passed before one could discern any results, and then one could not always recognize in them the fruit of one's own ideas. Not so in Peking. There you felt that you were the creator of policy. No conferences interfered with you and after a short time you could see the influence of your policy on the relations between your country and China."

In 1906, at the outset of his diplomatic career in London, Abrikossow met Aleksandr Petrovich Izvolskii, one-time Russian Minister in Tokyo (1900-1903), who had been appointed Foreign Minister, and had come to England prior to assuming his post in order to discuss Russian policy with Count Aleksandr Konstantinovich Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador in Great Britain. Benckendorff was a top-flight diplomat, a real gentleman, a grand seigneur, but he

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Dr. George A. Lensen is Professor of History and Director of Asian Studies at the Florida State University in Tallahassee. The original manuscript of Abrikossow's memoirs is being edited by Dr. Lensen for book publication. The author wishes to thank Professor Philip Mosely and Mrs. Lev F. Magerovskii of Columbia University's Archive of Russian and East European History and Culture for their permission to publish, and the Florida State University Research Council for supplying a photographic working copy.

hardly spoke Russian. "The Ambassador has received his education abroad and as the Russian language was not necessary for Russian diplomacy at that time, all correspondence being conducted in French, they had forgotten to teach him Russian." Indeed, like many Russian diplomats, he felt much more at home abroad than in his own country, where people mistrusted his foreign looks, especially his monocle. "It was amusing to see how these two high personages [Izvolskii and Benckendorff] tried to impress each other with the brilliance of their conversation," Abrikossow recalls.

> At the Embassy lunches to which Izvolskii came, they would perpetually compete in saying the most clever things and showing the greatest amount of knowledge. Both wore monocles, which I have always regarded as very useful in impressing your interlocutor. When you have no ready answer, you swing the monocle in place and critically look at the talker; he at once begins to wonder if he has not said some nonsense, and you gain time to think of a suitable reply. Our Ambassador was much more clever in these tricks and usually had the last word, until Izvolskii would switch to some question of higher mathematics and leave poor Benckendorff quite hewildered.

Izvolskii's tenure as Foreign Minister had expired when Abrikossow went to China on the eve of the revolution of 1911 as Second Secretary of Embassy. The Russian Minister in Peking at that time was Ivan Iakovlevich Korostovets. In the words of Abrikossow:

> The Minister was quite a peculiar man, a great cynic but full of brilliant ideas. He considered the majority of human beings to be either fools or rascals and took great pleasure in proving it by provoking them into losing their temper and showing their real nature. Most of his career passed in China, where he had started as a young secretary. Suspected of having poisoned the dog of his chief's wife, the perpetual barking of which robbed everyone of sleep, he had been exiled to Chefoo as Vice Consul.
>
> Later he had served on the staff of the Viceroy in Manchuria and had stayed at Port Arthur before the war, returning full of cynical stories about the Russian generals and predicting the inevitable Russo-Japanese War. He had accompanied Count Sergei Witte to the Portsmouth Peace Conference and had come back full of admiration for the way in which Witte had succeeded in turning the sympathies of the Americans from the Japanese toward the Russians. With his usual cynicism he asserted that Witte had done this by shaking hands with every Jew he met.
>
> After several years in the Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Office he was appointed Russian Minister in Peking, where he found full scope for his cleverness and eccentricity. He started by quarreling with the Military Attaché, Colonel Kornilov, who years later, during the Russian Revolution, was to become so famous as the last hope of the White Russians and was killed during the civil war. But in those peaceful days the Minister and the Military Attaché still could afford to quarrel, and as no secrets could be kept in Peking, the quarrel became one of the usual topics of conversation. Our Minister had a tender

Where in the World?

F.S.-Retired Addresses

THE list of retired Foreign Service personnel together with their addresses which in recent years has accompanied the September JOURNAL will again be prepared this year, but will be distributed to JOURNAL readers only upon request. Those wishing to receive this year's list should so inform the Association. The list will be furnished without charge to those who ask for it.

Yes, I would like to receive the list of retired F.S. personnel

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to: AFSA, Suite 301, 1742 G Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

spot in his heart towards the Chinese. He loved to make people lose their temper, but much as he tried to provoke the Chinese, he could not ruffle their placidity. He admired them for it and thought them much more clever than all our bureaucrats. Yet he never lost an opportunity to outwit them; it was a perpetual game of chess.

The career of Korostovets, in China at least, ended undiplomatically. "He had made so much fun of others," Abrikossow observes, "that it was no wonder that he was punished by becoming the laughing stock of Peking. He fell in love with a sixteen-year-old French girl and tried to elope with her. The girl's infuriated father, who occupied a high position in the Chinese service, stopped the train and the whole thing came to light. The girl was restored to her parents; the Minister continued to St. Petersburg alone."

Next to the Minister in importance was the Counsellor Mikhail Sergievich Shchekin. At the time of the outbreak of revolutionary hostilities he was Chargé d'Affaires. As the conduct of a diplomat and a Legation at a time of crisis is most revealing and crucial, Abrikossow's recollection of the reaction of Shchekin and others to the sudden eruption of fighting in Peking may be of interest. Returning to the Chancery he found Shchekin "giving orders left and right, using, as was his habit, foul language."

This Chargé liked to create an emergency situation and pose as the only person who could deal with it. He was seated with a fierce expression on his face and was bellowing at the officer who commanded our Legation guard and had just reported that half of the soldiers were away in the other part of Peking at Lenten services. The Chargé was shouting that here we had increased our forces because of the danger of an uprising among the Chinese and now that the uprising had come, most of the soldiers were away. The officer tried to explain that this was not his fault, for he commanded only the Cossacks and not the common soldiers, who received orders from his commander who was also away at the Russian Orthodox Mission. The voices were rising, the Chargé d'Affaires shouting that he would send a telegram to St. Petersburg asking the recall of the officer. Luckily, the other secretary, who had been dining at another Legation, entered just then and the Chargé turned to him, yelling that here we were in danger of losing our lives and the secretary was away flirting with the ladies. The secretary, who was extremely patriotic, saw that the Chargé was sitting with his hat on and began to shout how dare he sit before the portrait of the Emperor with his head covered. With all this shouting the Chancery was like a mad house. At that moment we heard the voices of a Cossack guard and a crowd of women who were trying to get past him, demanding to talk to someone from the Legation. I went out to investigate and found that the prostitutes, mostly Russian Jewesses, who lived outside the Diplomatic Quarter, had come to seek asylum in the Russian Legation from the approaching fires and crowds of Chinese soldiers, who were beginning to rob everybody and everything. This calmed our Chargé down and he peacefully began to discuss with the officer where to put all these

women. I noticed that the Chargé took off his hat, and the secretary smiled triumphantly. Peace had been restored. Some old barracks were found, and after a fatherly speech by the Chargé that as long as they were in the Russian Legation they must forget their profession, the prostitutes were led away by a grinning Cossack.

The proclamation of a Republic did not bring stability to China and the Russian Legation sought various means of furthering its cause. Thus, for example, the Chargé published a French newspaper to promote Russian interests.

> He found an unemployed French journalist, [Abrikossow recalls] a very energetic but also very unscrupulous person. Every day the Frenchman would come to our Chargé and together they wrote the whole newspaper. I had to supply extracts from the reports of our different consuls, and these were printed as correspondence from the special correspondents of the paper. At the beginning there was always a political article dictated by our Chargé. As the latter was a man who could not tolerate any contradictions, our newspaper soon became involved in a polemic with the English newspaper, which was published by the Chinese Foreign Office. In the heat of the polemic the aim of the newspaper was forgotten. As the English paper promoted the interests of Yüan Shih-k'ai, our newspaper began to attack him. Amused, the other diplomats asserted that their breakfasts had beeome more entertaining since the publication of our newspaper; they looked forward to reading what new attacks our paper had invented.
>
> One day the English paper stated that the attacks of our newspaper did not deserve any attention, because it was a well known fact that they were written by a man who received money from a certain Legation. True as this was, our Frenchman became furious and went forth, in the best French tradition, to challenge the Chinese editor to a duel. When he appeared at the office of the Chinese paper with a second, the panic-stricken editor tried to hide under the bed. The Frenchman found him and calling the whole staff together showed them the editor under the bed and expressed his regret that they had to work for such a contemptible man, who did not even deserve to be challenged to a duel. The next day he published the whole story in our newspaper. When our Minister came back from leave, he was greatly amused by the episode and allowed the fight between the two newspapers to continue. But after his unsuccessful elopement with the French girl, the Minister was replaced with a serious man who did not have the same sense of humor, and put a stop to the whole business.

The Minister who replaced Korostovets in Peking and served there from 1912 until 1916, when he was transferred to Tokyo, was Vasilii Nikolaevich Krupenskii. With his arrival the whole atmosphere of the Legation changed. Abrikossow recalls:

> At first I missed the brilliant fireworks of his predecessor, but soon I began to appreciate the steady work of the new man. . . . He may not have displayed the same brilliant yet often misplaced initiative of his

predecessor, but when he received his instructions from the Foreign Office, he responded with such fervor that he usually attained the desired results.

Next to the Minister and the Counsellor or Chargé in importance was the interpreter. Speaking of China in 1911-12, Abrikossow observes:

> Very few Chinese could speak any foreign language and all communication with the Foreign Office was done in Chinese. This increased the importance of interpreters, the only persons who could speak Chinese.
>
> The very first time that I was present at negotiations with Chinese officials, I realized that the Minister was absolutely helpless; everything was in the hands of the interpreter. The interpreter in a Legation generally was a person who had devoted his entire life to the study of Chinese. . . . Very often, especially if the Minister was energetic and wanted quick results, the interpreter found himself much more in sympathy with the Chinese than with his own Minister.

Before returning to Russia from China for a period of service in the Foreign Ministry, Abrikossow paid a brief visit to Japan, where he made his first acquaintance with the Russian Ambassador Nikolai Nikolaevich Malevskii-Malevich.

> In Tokyo I called on our Embassy, where a pompous Ambassador gave me two fingers. . . . This Ambassador had served all his life in the Ministry, where he had been chief of some department. When after the war Russia had to conclude a fishery agreement with Japan and the Vice Minister, who was to have presided over the negotiations, backed out at the last moment on the ground that his knowledge of fishing was limited to eating fish in a restaurant, the department chief was appointed in his stead, and impressed the Japanese with the grandness of his manners. Upon the conclusion of the negotiations, in order to forestall the military from nominating a general, the department chief was named first Russian Ambassador in Tokyo. Thus it was through fish that he became Ambassador, and remaining in Tokyo for nearly a decade had ample opportunity to display his grand manners. But grand manners alone did not make a great ambassador.
>
> When at the beginning of World War I he was asked by our Foreign Office on which side Japan would be, he joined the French Ambassador in drafting a long proposal for keeping Japan neutral, at a time when it was already known in St. Petersburg that Japan would side with us. It was not proof of sagacity, when, after ten years in the country, the diplomat could not tell whether in case of war the country would be our friend or our enemy. During the war we desperately needed Japanese ammunitions; the Ambassador in Tokyo was so slow in his efforts that the annoyed military had him replaced with our energetic Minister in Peking, Krupenski. This came as a great blow to the Ambassador, Malevskii-Malevich, because he was sure that there could not be a better representative than he.

by George Alexander Lensen

When Abrikossow returned to Japan shortly as Second Secretary of the Russian Embassy, Malevskii-Malevich was still Ambassador.

> He declared that the Second Secretary must help him in his social functions, that is to say he must be thoroughly familiar with protocol—who follows whom and who sits where at dinner—and must listen to all the gossip and report it to him, for he alone could judge what gossip was worthy of attention. To underline this, he related how he had once listened to some gossip while playing bridge and had discovered a most important diplomatic secret. Malevskii-Malevich then lectured at length how a member of the Embassy must dress and demonstrated with his own wardrobe.
>
> He even touched on the delicate question of my relations with women, and demonstrated how to use the telephone by calling the Italian Ambassador and inquiring after his health. When I met the Italian Ambassador later on, he complained that the Russian Ambassador kept calling him constantly to ask about his health and to express his pleasure that it was good, and asked that I tell him that the phone in the Italian Embassy was in a cold corridor and that the perpetual calls would lead to his catching cold.

Determined from the very beginning not to become a protocol expert, butler or gossipmonger, Abrikossow found a happy substitute in the person of a Baltic Baron.

> The Russian Foreign Office [Abrikossow notes] was full of Baltic Barons and even the newspapers, when they found fault with Russian diplomacy, frequently criticized the Foreign Office for having too many Barons in posts abroad. Being quite Russian I read such articles with a certain amount of joy, but the further I moved in my career the more I understood the preference for Barons. As a rule a Chief dislikes the contradictions which are in the character of every Russian. A Baron makes an ideal bureaucrat since he never dreams of having an opinion different from that of his superior. Should the Chief make a mistake in his report and instead of writing that a chicken had hatched an egg, record that an egg had hatched a chicken, a Russian would attempt not only to correct the mistake but add some thoughts of his own, which might change the whole meaning of what the Chief was trying to say. A Baltic Baron, on the other hand, would copy the mistake as he found it, believing, if he noted the absurdity of the thing, that the very absurdity must have a special meaning. Such an attitude was flattering to the Chiefs and consequently they preferred to surround themselves with well mannered and correct Barons, rather than willful and capricious Russians with the tendency to consider themselves more clever than their superiors. Thus, at any rate, it was in our Embassy in Tokyo.

The atmosphere in the Russian Embassy in Tokyo was anything but dynamic. Shchekin, the gloomy Counsellor with whom Abrikossow had served in China and who had been

transferred to Japan, spent his time referring to the Ambassador as an "idiot"; "the First Secretary, a Russian Prince (Lev Vladimirovich Urusov), would stand with his back towards the open fire and discourse eloquently on the policy he would follow toward Japan were he ambassador, while the two Barons silently copied the Ambassador's despatches or ciphered telegrams. At twelve o'clock the Prince would finish his tirade and declare that it was time for lunch." At lunch the Russians would sit at a special table for diplomats at a local hotel and exchange gossip of little interest. Rarely did they associate with Japanese who did "little more than animate their landscape."

There was one notable exception to this, the Military Attaché (Vladimir Konstantinovich Samoilov), "a very original and amusing person."

> He had come to Japan before the Russo-Japanese War and had promptly fallen under the spell of Japanese women. When war was declared he had departed, leaving his Madame Butterfly behind. When I had met him in London, where he served as Assistant Military Attaché during the war, he was most miserable, and constantly spoke of the charms of Japanese women. After the war he was reassigned to Japan, where he was met by his old mistress, who at once began to rule over him with an iron hand. . . . Occasionally she even turned him out of his own house and he had to sleep at a hotel. At the same time she wanted to place her female relations in the households of bachelor foreigners and every time a new member of the Embassy was expected in Tokyo, she had such a relative ready, and it was the General's duty to hint to the newcomer that a charming Madame Butterfly was waiting for him.

On the eve of World War I, Abrikossow returned to St. Petersburg and worked in the Foreign Office's Far Eastern Section, whose chief Kozakov, a "clever and hard working" man, "absorbed in his work," quietly but effectively worked behind the scenes to restore Russia's Far Eastern position. In 1916 Abrikossow went back to Japan as First Secretary of the Embassy together with Krupenskii, his old boss in China, who was replacing Malevskii-Malevich. Little did Abrikossow realize that he was to remain in Japan for thirty years!

The collapse of the Russian Monarchy undermined the foundations of the old Embassy in Tokyo. It continued to function under the Provisional Government, but its position was complicated by the agitation of countless political exiles, on their way back to Russia, who held political rallies in Japan. Paradoxically, the victory of the Bolsheviks stabilized the position of the Embassy. The Japanese brooked no Communist propaganda and the Embassy received a regular income from the Russo-Asiatic Bank, to which the Chinese continued to make the Boxer Rebellion indemnity payments. Krupenskii, with his tact and common sense, not only continued to enjoy "the esteem of all foreign representatives as well as of the Japanese Government," but for some years remained in the position of Dean of the Diplomatic Corps. Eventually he left for Europe and as the old Counsellor Shchekin had died, Abrikossow remained as Chargé d'Affaires. "My ambition had been fulfilled," Abrikossow records. "I had

achieved a top position in the Diplomatic Service. But I realized that all this was the result of extremely artificial circumstances and could not last long. . . . The only consolation I had was that the Embassy still had a measure of prestige and that I could consider myself as a captain who stays with his ship till it sinks."

Negotiations leading to the recognition of the Soviet Government continued, off and on, for several years. As Abrikossow followed them in the Japanese press, he was amazed at the "arrogant" conduct of the Soviet negotiator Adolf Abramovich Ioffe, who "declared himself ill and received the representatives of the Foreign Office lying in bed." He was even photographed in his nightshirt, with the Japanese sitting modestly at his bedside. "All former Russian diplomats must have turned in their graves."

After the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, Abrikossow lost all official position and had to move out of the Embassy. But throughout his stay in Japan, through World War II, he was recognized by the Japanese as the spokesman of the White Russian colony.

The first Soviet Chargé d'Affaires was Grigorii Zinov'evich Bessedovskii. Cordially received by the Japanese, he was the same Bessedovskii who some years later, when he was at the Soviet Embassy in Paris "believing that he was about to be purged, escaped from the Bolsheviks by jumping over the Embassy wall." At first the Soviet representative conducted himself very modestly.

> In time, with the success of the Soviet Government and the increase in the number of Foreign Powers which extended recognition to Soviet Russia, the general attitude of the Soviet representative changed; he became more and more arrogant and began to give huge receptions to which people flocked to enjoy good food and criticize the lack of manners of the brand-new Soviet diplomats. Above all, people talked about the caviar, which the Soviet representative presented to his guests. We in the old Embassy [Abrikossow reflected] had never realized what an important role caviar could play in diplomatic relations. In their attitude toward the Soviet Embassy, the diplomats in Tokyo could be divided into three categories; those who could not expect to receive the caviar because their Governments did not yet recognize the Soviet regime, secretly envied the others, but continued to criticize the Soviets; those who had already received a gift of caviar from the Soviet Embassy and showed their thankfulness by avoiding criticism of the Soviets; and those who expected to receive such a gift and praised the Soviets in a most elaborate way. What a pity that we in the old Embassy had not realized the value of caviar in diplomatic relations.

Izvolskii, Korostovets, Shchekin, Krupenskii, Malevskii-Malevich, Bessedovskii, and Abrikossow himself—the personalities of Russian diplomats in the Far East were all varied. Yet one cannot but ponder over the universality of the stereotypes portrayed in "The Ugly American."

An Historical View of Personnel and Diplomacy

by R. Smith Simpson

Of the six published analyses of the State Department and the Foreign Service made at governmental request since the last war, that of the Herter Committee represents in many respects the most realistic effort.

One of the healthy contributions the report makes to the discussion of our diplomatic requirements is to define the environment in which diplomacy must be practiced. Not all predecessors of the Herter Committee have taken the trouble to do this, which may account for their recommendations being insufficiently realistic and perceptive of the developing world situation since 1945. Environment obviously determines not only the techniques we must employ in diplomacy but the personal skills we must seek (and nurture) in our diplomats.

The new diplomacy the Committee concluded to have evolved from our present environment it describes in the following terms:

> In pursuit of our international goals, we have developed an arsenal of instruments more varied than ever before. They include: all the tools of traditional diplomacy; international law; intelligence; political action; technical assistance and various types of foreign economic aid; military aid programs; information and psychological programs; monetary policies; trade development programs; educational exchange; cultural programs; and, more recently, measures to counter insurgency movements. Most of these fall outside the older definition of diplomacy, but all of them must be considered actual or potential elements of United States programs. Together they constitute what is here called the "new diplomacy." (p. 4.)

Have any of these ever fallen outside of diplomacy? When was political action not a part of diplomacy? Is not political action the center-piece of diplomacy? Were not all the elements mentioned by the Committee a part of European diplomacy of the nineteenth and early twentieth century? Do not these elements go as far back as recorded history? One can think, for instance, of the technical and military assistance of Theodosius I who, through a combination of military power and diplomacy, overcame the Visigoths and resettled them in certain designated areas of the Roman empire, securing in return their services as soldiers. This example goes back only to the fourth century A.D. but one can without difficulty recall earlier examples, such as those afforded by Philip of Macedonia, of the melding of military elements with the diplomatic, including in the diplomatic such elements or instruments as bribery, subversion, torture, assassination and insurgency.

Let us look at the more recent example of James Bryce, the British ambassador to this country from 1907 to 1913. Just as his study, "The American Commonwealth," is still a classic, so his ambassadorship to the United States remains a classic, illustrative of how popular and effective a diplomatic representative can be if he is profound enough to know thoroughly his own country, the country to which he is sent, and the world in which they both function. Combining the qualities of scholar, philosopher and practical statesman, Bryce in his diplomacy effected a very skillful amalgam of political action, information and psychological programs, cultural programs, intelligence and international law.

But let us not overlook our own earliest diplomacy. During and after our Revolution, international law, intelligence and political action, not to mention insurgency and economic and military aid, were an integral part of what we were trying to do. The economic and military aid were in reverse—solicited from abroad rather than extended by ourselves—but the elements were there, fortunately for us. Furthermore, our early diplomatic representatives were information and psychological programs as well as cultural programs in themselves, which made them eminently skillful of course. For there never was a period in which it was more necessary that America be understood by Europe—not just by governments but by politicians in and out of the government, scientists, philosophers, educators. This was accomplished with eminent success by the Jeffersons, the Franklins, the Adamses of the time. Such was the quality of Jefferson, moreover, that when he was serving at Paris as the diplomatic representative of the confederated thirteen States, he was consulted by French political leaders on a variety of their domestic political questions.

Since 1900 our government has made use of private citizens and sometimes public officials outside the diplomatic establishment to engage in programs which we now too easily associate with a new diplomacy. The work of Arthur Powell Davis comes to mind, a civil engineer who for eight years was chief engineer (1906-14) and nine years director (1914-23) of our Reclamation Service. His technical assistance to Turkestan and Panama was too real for one to conclude that this type of assistance originated

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R. Smith Simpson, who voluntarily retired from the Foreign Service a year ago, has contributed over the years of his association with the Service, a number of articles to the *Journal*, including "Are We Getting Our Share of the Best" in November, on the quality of candidates for the Service.

with us quite newly. Grandiose programs along these lines have originated quite recently, of course, but the weapon—if one must speak of diplomacy in cold war terminology—has been in our arsenal for a good many years. The indigenous Indians, indeed, taught it to us, making it a part of their diplomacy in dealing with the earliest settlers on this continent.

Few Americans, including those in our diplomatic establishment, seem to be aware of just how broad were the development programs by which we endeavored to discharge our self-assumed responsibilities to underdeveloped areas inherited from our war with Spain. Largely neglected, accordingly, is the experience we gained in political, military, economic, educational, informational, psychological, social and administrative affairs, from working with the underdeveloped peoples concerned. From 1899 to 1901, the rebellion of Aguinaldo confronted the U. S. Philippine mission with the necessity of adding counter-insurgency programs to the others. Unfortunately, indifference to diplomacy—to off-shore responsibilities and experiences—until comparatively recently, as well as our failure to require some familiarity with these responsibilities and experiences of the men and women entering our Foreign Service, has caused these experiences and their lessons to be lost. It means also that too many of us, in trying to define a new diplomacy, are actually in process of discovering an old diplomacy.

I would suggest that what may be new in our present situation and therefore what may be new in the diplomacy we are endeavoring to create to meet this situation are such things as:

(1) the range or scope of elements required to be compounded to meet not simply a situation in one or two areas of the world but in a very large number of areas, on virtually every continent, and therefore requiring considerable organization and coordination;

(2) the range of peoples and cultures involved, requiring a far greater recourse than ever before to the social and behavioral sciences;

(3) today's accelerated speed at which the world, its decisions and events revolve, requiring greater celerity of decision and maneuver, as well as greater profundity lest decisions produce only superficial improvisation from which later retreat must be contrived;

(4) the extensive participation of people, press and public opinion in the diplomatic process;

(5) the rise of a philosophy, implemented by governments, hostile to Western philosophy, life and conduct;

(6) nuclear power, with its capacity for widespread annihilation.

We must view even these elements with discriminating, historical knowledge, however. Ancient Athens also faced a hostile philosophy. Ancient Athens also faced subversion. Ancient Athens also faced the problem of the participation of popular assemblies and public opinion in the diplomatic process. Nor is the concept of diplomacy as extending to

dealing with peoples (the government-to-people and people-to-people approaches) really novel. In the 1790's a French Minister, known as Citizen Genêt, had this same concept. Had he not been so imaginative in developing it he might have lasted longer. Raising troops and contracting for privateers in a neutral country is, after all, stretching the government-to-people conceptualization a little far. Nor should we forget, as far as element (2) is concerned, that the Japanese specialist and "the China hand" were part of our diplomatic effort long ago. The fact that we dropped them and have now begun once again to replace them does not make them new or area specialization new.

In suggesting what may be new elements in our diplomacy since World War II, I mentioned first the considerable organization and coordination required of a current diplomatic establishment. This element has not only been emphasized by, but has been almost an obsession of, recent analyses of the State Department and the Foreign Service. There is a heavy emphasis upon it by the Herter Committee. It seems that this emphasis has been carried so far as to require a diplomatic Copernicus to come along to suggest that the focal point of all this question of personnel for diplomacy is *personnel* for diplomacy quite as much as *organization* for diplomacy. A diplomatic establishment and its performance of the art of diplomacy revolve quite as much around the individuals who make it up as around an organizational chart.

At a critical time in the history of Mexico, David Eugene Thompson of Nebraska was our representative there. He was described by one who served with him as "a man of powerful personality, of large intelligence and shrewd judgment, and of sharp and forthright tongue. . . By the life-long exercise of a naturally strong intellect on a vast number and wide variety of books, he had, for all his lack of formal schooling, made himself into an unusually well-educated man. . . His great value to his country lay in the fact that he possessed, as probably no other man possessed, the absolute confidence of the aging Mexican dictator, Don Porfirio Diaz . . . and the friendship between them illustrates the great and beneficient power a North American diplomat could, if he were trusted and well liked, exercise unofficially in Spanish American capitals."[1] Now observe what this led to: "Aware of the relationship between the President and the Ambassador, state governors, generals, police officials, federal judges and even judges of the supreme court would drop into the Embassy to consult him about any case that might happen to involve Americans or American interests."[2] This influence, this practice of diplomacy, was personal to Thompson. It could not have been produced by any reorganization of the State Department or the diplomatic service. His type and philosophy may not be those we need today in every country, although I suggest there are a few dictators left and we could use some influence with them, whether of the David Eugene Thompson or the Llewellyn Thompson type. The essential questions are: who are these Thompsons, where and how do we find them, and how do we preserve their talents through an extended diplomatic career? What are the conditions of service required for

[1] William Franklin Sands, in collaboration with Joseph M. Lalley, "Our Jungle Diplomacy," University of North Carolina Press, 1944.
[2] Ibid, 133-4.

the cultivation and development of their talents?

Another example—one carrying no stigma of dictatorship—is that of Jules Jusserand who was the French Ambassador in Washington for thirteen years, 1902-1915. Note the length of service. But note also the depth of his culture. He had published in 1889 "English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages," six years later a "Literary History of the English People," and in 1898 "Shakespeare in France." If you are inclined to discount these scholarly accomplishments in a diplomat and to question the connection between diplomacy and English wayfaring life in the Middle Ages, you may be missing the whole essence of diplomacy, the new as well as the old. And if you wonder how, today, a diplomatic officer could engage in such pursuits you may be raising the very vital question which commissions and committees inquiring into the deficiencies and failures of American diplomacy are missing.

Along with his considerable scholarly and reflective accomplishments, Jusserand was tactful and shrewd, practical and perceptive. And to what did all this lead? He was a close friend of every American president during his period of service in Washington. When President Theodore Roosevelt had a particularly difficult question to resolve, domestic or international, he sought the advice of Jusserand. At a time when John Hay, then Secretary of State, was ill and Roosevelt wanted advice on an international problem, he turned not to the Number Two man in the State Department, nor to another Cabinet member, but to this foreign ambassador. Jusserand was one of his confidants and advisers.

Such are the qualities of diplomacy, such are the qualities that solve a government's dilemma of exercising influence without risk or charge of interference. For the influence is personal, arising from the profundity, understanding, experience, and tact of the individual diplomatic representative.

This, I submit, is what we are trying to define as diplomacy, old and new, and the ability to perform it is what we are trying to find, train, nurture and reward by suitable conditions in our diplomatic establishment. In seeking an improvement of our diplomatic performance, then, the basic questions are: what kinds of knowledge, sagacity, perceptiveness, experience and dynamism do we need, how can we attract those people who possess them, how can we test such people more accurately both for admission and promotion purposes, and what are the conditions of service we must provide abroad as well as in Washington to nurture these qualities? To meet this challenge we must first—and accurately—analyze diplomacy, diplomatic processes and the results we want—the Theodosius, Thompson, Bryce, Jusserand results, if you will. We must then establish the criteria fitted to these results and make the criteria so widely known that people can prepare systematically and adequately as candidates. Drag-net publicity campaigns on "the Foreign Service" will not suffice. Next, we must bring to bear on selection and promotion processes the most up-to-date techniques the behavioral sciences can provide. Finally, in the field, as at headquarters, we must create the conditions which will encourage the results we want. Few, I think, would say we are doing these things successfully now. Few would say the Herter Report dealt perceptively with them.

A day in the life of a Protection and Welfare Officer:

Tokyo Sans Geisha

by HARRISON M. HOLLAND

WHEN I arrived at the office at 8:30 a.m., an American lady was waiting to see me. She was a tall, slender woman of about thirty-five, fashionably dressed, with deep blue eyes and blond hair. She was very beautiful. She entered my office and, tugging nervously on her handkerchief, began her story.

Her husband had come to Japan alone six months ago and since then had repeatedly urged her to join him. But upon her arrival he informed her that he was living with a Japanese girl and no longer wanted her. Sick at heart, she had decided to seek advice from the American Consul.

She burst into tears at this point and I automatically reached for paper handkerchiefs, which I keep in the drawer for just such occasions. Ten tissues later, she was sufficiently composed to continue her story. She said that she was going to fight for her husband and that I had to go into combat with her. As a first step she wanted me to advise her on how Japanese women handled their men and why they seemed to do such a better job of it than American women. Somewhat reticently, I observed that I did not necessarily agree that Japanese women were more adept at handling men than American women, and hastened to qualify even this statement on the basis of hearsay evidence and insufficient experience. I urged her to stay in Tokyo for several weeks and await developments, counseling patience. I told her that she was, after all, the wife in the triangle and was thus in a strong, competitive position. She was at first reluctant, but after thinking it over for a few minutes decided to remain in Japan as I advised. She asked if she could keep in touch with me while she was in town and I assured her that she could. I heard from her several times, and then one day she called to say that she was going back to the United States and get a divorce as she had been unsuccessful in effecting a reconciliation. Five months later, I issued a Certificate of Witness to Marriage to her former husband, a paunchy man in his fifties, and his Japanese girl friend who was an Asian counterpart of his beautiful ex-wife.

The next emergency rudely awakened me from my musings about the lovely lady in distress. A secretary in the Passport and Citizenship Branch suddenly appeared, asking me to come to the Branch immediately and deal with an American man acting queerly and threatening the female employees. Fifty-eight seconds later (the Branch was just down the hall), I was confronted by the sight of an American of about thirty standing in the reception area, leering at the female employees while he calmly took off his trousers. He still had on a Scotch plaid shirt, green tie and sneakers. He was unshaven and had unruly brown hair which had obviously not been combed for days. His undershorts were purple. I told him to put his trousers back on but he ignored me and continued to disrobe, removing his undershirt. A Marine guard finally hustled him out of the office and into the men's lavatory, at my request.

Ten minutes later, the Marine was back with a fully clothed, docile and cooperative American. He said that he had served in the Army in Japan, had been separated from the Service in California, and had been in and out of mental hospitals for the past several years. Having decided one day that he wanted to return to Japan, he gathered up his belongings, cashed some bonds, walked out of the hospital unnoticed, secured a passport and taxied to the airport where he bought a ticket for Japan. He said that upon his arrival, he had begun to feel a strange urge to undress in public. Because he felt more at home at the Embassy than at any other place in Tokyo, he decided to disrobe there. I arranged to have him admitted to a military hospital and he was shortly thereafter air-evacuated to the United States. I later learned that he had been re-committed to the hosptial from which he had so nonchalantly departed several weeks previously.

After a rather trying morning it was lunch time. I decided that a walk in the crisp autumn air to my favorite Japanese restaurant would be just the right tonic. But as I was leaving, I met a disheveled looking American in the doorway who muttered that he wanted to see the American Consul. He had obviously been drinking: his eyes were bloodshot, he had difficulty focusing, and he was unsteady on his feet. He had a three-day growth of beard and his clothes were in tatters. I took the young man by the arm—he was about twenty-eight—and went back to my office. His story was typical. He had been a G.I. stationed in Japan, had fallen in love with a Japanese girl, but had returned without her to the United States in order to be separated from the Service. Not being able to forget her, he worked at odd jobs until he had saved enough money to return. On his return he found the country different as a civilian. He was unable to locate his sweetheart, and began to spend his

FSO HARRISON M. HOLLAND entered the Service in 1955 and is currently Second Secretary of Embassy in Tokyo, Japan.

money on substitutes. But the "floating world" consumed every cent, and he was now penniless. He asked for a loan but I told him that this was impossible. I advised him to wire his parents for a return passage and said that until his boat sailed I would do what I could to get him fresh clothes, a bath, and lodgings. He refused my offer, got unsteadily to his feet and wove out of my office shrugging his shoulders, muttering that he would look elsewhere. Two weeks later the Tokyo police reported that they had picked him up in an alley half dead from starvation. I was able to get him admitted to a military hospital in the Tokyo area on an emergency basis. Three weeks later, the attending doctor said that he was ready for discharge and expressed the view that he should be sent home at once. Arrangements for a return passage were quickly made with money his father had deposited with the Embassy. A month later he wrote me the good news that he was "on the wagon," had just married his neighborhood sweetheart, and was building a new life.

But back to my day—I never got to my favorite Japanese restaurant for lunch. My next request was frivolous to the point of relief. A lady wanted to buy a hat which she had seen while strolling on the Ginza. After several telephone calls and consultations with the female members of my office, I finally located a millinery shop that agreed to make a hat which would fit her description. As she left, her husband, a retired business executive, came over to thank me. I had rescued him from the painful duty of spending precious time on an impossible task.

By late afternoon I reasoned that by the law of averages I had my quota of cases for the day but it was not to be. I was suddenly confronted by a tall, spare woman of about thirty-five who asked in hushed tones if she could see me in private. She confidentially explained that she had serious doubts about the honorable intentions of her fiance and suspected that he was in some way connected with "foreign agents." She insisted that I check into the matter. Apparently the day's toll was beginning to show on my face because she gave me a stern look and informed me that her problem was very important, not only to her but to the security of the United States. I inquired as to what she specifically wanted done and she replied that as a first step I must check to see if her fiance had a valid passport. He had been postponing the marriage under the pretense that it would have to await a passport renewal. She also wanted a full investigation into his past and present activities.

I told her that her fiancé was entitled to have his privacy respected and that the Embassy required his permission to divulge facts in its files about him to persons other than his family or relatives. When I hesitantly offered the comment that a successful marriage is generally built on mutual trust, she accused me of being the most uncooperative consul she had ever met. With that she left. Three weeks later she brought her fiance to my office and announced that they were to be married, and they were. (She never had to be abrupt with him as she had with me, for I do not recall hearing the young man say a word.)

As I prepared to depart, a local doctor called me to report that an elderly American had just been rushed to a hospital, gravely ill, and that he was not expected to live through the night. I understood his implication; that I would have to inform the man's wife if death occurred. And

an hour after I reached home, the fateful call came. The American had died and I must now inform his widow. While I dreaded the thought of having to do it, I called the hotel management and asked them to arrange for me to see the widow. An hour later, I went up in the elevator with the hotel doctor, a hard knot in the pit of my stomach. I knocked on the door and the widow opened it with a tense look on her face. However, one glance told her the tragic news and she began to cry. She sobbed uncontrollably for about ten minutes and moaned, "What shall I do now, what shall I do now? I'm alone, alone." The doctor and I tried to comfort her and finally managed to quiet her down. When I left the room at 11:00 p.m. and began to reflect on what had just occurred, my clearest impression was of the terror of loneliness that I saw in the widow's eyes. I knew things would improve when she returned to the United States and rejoined her friends, but for the moment she was suffering terribly and I could do little to help.

As I returned home through the quiet streets of a sleeping Tokyo, I began to think about the day that had just passed. The police assistance, the hospitalization, the doctor's notification; these were typical of the assistance received daily from interested local Japanese and officials. I could recall case after case in which a Japanese policeman, an immigration officer, a prosecutor, or a hospital manager had assisted the Embassy in trying to help a stranded, destitute, or sick American. These men and women were always helpful and cooperative, invariably doing more for the American in trouble than official duties warranted.

As I thought about the psychological jolts of the past twelve hours, I was more certain than I had ever been that a Foreign Service officer who does not at some stage in his career have the experience of being a protection and welfare officer is perhaps a little less humble, a little less sympathetic, and a little less understanding of the trials and tribulations of his fellow men than he might otherwise be.

the undoing of nearly three years' effort to keep the two sides talking to each other. Still, it did not blight his faith in face-to-face diplomacy. It was he, as much as anyone, who persuaded President Kennedy to meet Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June, 1961.

No explosion occurred at that meeting. But the young President, still smarting from the failure of the hare-brained attempt in April to invade Cuba with a small force of exiles, was given a rough time by Khrushchev, particularly on the Berlin issue. The President did not enjoy the experience, but he did not hold it against the Ambassador.

When Thompson's long tour in Moscow came to an end and he returned to the United States in the summer of 1962, he was made Ambassador at Large and given special responsibility for relations with the Soviets.

Not long after the Cuban crisis, when Thompson was able to relax for a few moments, a friend asked him what he thought of the Foreign Service after all his experience. Thompson said his years in the Foreign Service had enabled him to participate in the making of history, in the effort to meet the great issues and challenges of our times. Surely, it would be hard to choose a career that offered higher rewards than this.

Service Glimpses

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1. **Cali.** Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, tests the odor of a tropical fruit proffered by Ambassador Fulton Freeman at a Colombian public market. John L. Ohmans, consul, appears in the center background.

2. **Madrid.** On the set of "55 Days at Peking," during the filming of that movie, are (l. to r., background) Ralph Wheelwright, Ambassador Robert F. Woodward, producer Samuel Bronston, Howard Newman, (foreground), Robert F. Woodward, Jr., Mary C. Woodward, Miss Wellington and Mrs. Woodward.

3.

3. **Djakarta.** Mrs. Howard P. Jones (center), wife of the Ambassador, and Mrs. J. S. Reid weigh in a young visitor of the Mother and Child Health Center. The health center is a project of the American Women's Association in conjunction with Indonesian volunteers who founded the clinic last year. At upper left is Mrs. Perry Ellis, wife of the Counselor for Economic Affairs.

4.

4. **Vienna.** Ambassador James W. Riddleberger takes a curtain call with the cast and authors of "The Diplomatic Follies of 1963." Mrs. Lois Prentice, director and co-author, FSO William Bodde, Jr., coordinator and co-author, Mrs. Adele Porter, co-author, and M/Sgt. George Francis, co-author, are shown on the Ambassador's left. Earlier the Ambassador had appeared as a surprise performer in a scene staged in the Embassy snack bar.

"Autumn in Italy" *by Lynn Moffly*

Letters to the Editor

Pseudonyms may be used only if the original letter includes the writer's full name. The Journal takes no responsibility for its writers' opinions. All letters are subject to condensation.

Probation and Initial Training

THE FOLLOWING comments are offered as an indication of the reaction of junior Foreign Service officers in the Department of State to those recommendations of the Herter Committee which regard the Junior Officer Program.

The Herter Committee indicates that the Junior Officer Program can be made a more effective instrument for providing the Service with able mid-career and senior officers. The Committee would achieve this goal by lengthening the probationary and training period to include classes 7 and 6, as well as 8. Coupled with this period would be a system of rapid promotion and—though less explicitly suggested by the Committee—a higher selection-out rate. Although theoretically lengthening this trial period, the Committee would in practice shorten it for many by recruiting more officers at the levels of classes 7 and 6. It would also require that junior officers during this period be exposed to substantive jobs.

While agreeing with the intent of these recommendations, we are disturbed by their application to officers recruited at the FSO-8 level. Unless there is, in fact, rapid promotion (or a high rate of selection out) an O-8 could expect to stay in training and on probation for six years or more until he reaches the level of O-5. This assumes the rather rapid promotion rate of two years in grade. Six years on probation would be demoralizing, six years of initial training is unnecessary.

Training should be separated from probation. Initial training in the Foreign Services takes the form of orientation and is applicable to all entering officers. We believe that the present Junior Officer Program meets the orientation training requirements of the Service and should be continued.

The purpose of probation, as we understand it, is to provide the Service with an opportunity to review its initial decision to admit an officer. The present probationary period provides such an opportunity, i.e., an officer is on probation until he receives his first promotion.

The Committee coupled their probationary and training recommendations with the suggestion that commissions generally be granted only when an officer reaches class five. We agree with the Foreign Service JOURNAL (February 1963) that the implementation of this suggestion would be demoralizing to junior ranking officers. The absence of a commission could prevent the officer from enjoying import privileges and exclude him from diplomatic lists.

Another recommendation of the Committee which affects junior officers concerns functional assignments. The Committee deplored the jobs that junior officers are often given at present. Declaring that such work stifles initiative at the moment when it should be encouraged, the Committee recommended that all junior officers be offered the opportunity of performing substantive jobs. While we all too well recognize the validity of this observation, we have also noted that there are not enough substantive jobs to go around. Furthermore, we note that the "dull" positions many of us presently occupy are jobs that must be done. Thus, to correct this particular situation, as the Committee recommends, significant changes presumably would be required in the Foreign Service personnel system. Recognizing the practical limitations placed by financial and administrative considerations upon such changes, we support the gradual solution of strengthening the Staff Corps and recruiting for specific functions. Specialized recruiting, of course, should be followed by a policy of early career specialization for those officers qualified and interested.

JOHN A. FERCH
President 1962-63
Junior Foreign Service Officers Club
Washington

Cheers

WELL, I certainly was very much relieved to read Mr. Little's letter in the July issue in which he assures us that we are not really a third-rate organization. It is most refreshing to see that at least one observer is convinced we are doing a first-rate job for our country, that we are moving forward, not backward.

Hurrah for Mr. Little!

HARRIS H. BALL

Rangoon

A Bureaucrat's Orisons

HERE are two items which may be appropriate for the JOURNAL's revered columns:

Short form of Service to be used in Government Offices

Let us pray:

O Lord, grant that this day we come to no decisions, neither run into any kind of responsibility, but that all our doings may be ordered to establish new and quite unwanted departments, for ever and ever. AMEN.

Hymn:

O Thou who seest all things below,
Grant that Thy servants may go slow,
That they may study to comply
With regulations till they die.

Teach us, Lord, to reverence,
Committees more than common sense,
Impress our minds to make no plan,
But pass the baby when we can.

And when the Tempter seeks to give
Us feelings of initiative,
Or when alone we go too far,
Chasties us with a Circular.

Mid War and Tumult, Fire and Forms,
Thus will Thy servants ever be,
A flock of perfect sheep for Thee.

AHMEN

Vientiane

An Integral Part Today

OVER the years I have been gratified to see expressed in the pages of the Foreign Service JOURNAL the interest that many officers show in the plight of their local assistant the FSL.

As a local employee of many years standing, I was especially gratified to see the recommendations for the formulations of an FSL Personnel Policy submitted by Mr. John W. Bowling in the July issue of the JOURNAL.

Hail the day, when also the Department recognizes the FSL group as an integral part of the Foreign Service.

JORGEN WERNER

Copenhagen

Letters to the Editor

Pseudonyms may be used only if the original letter includes the writer's full name. The Journal takes no responsibility for its writers' opinions. All letters are subject to condensation.

Scotch Mist

I HAVE GIVEN deep and intensive thought as to how to maintain a reasonable flow of Scotch whiskey to the field for representational (of course) purposes without unduly harming the U. S. halance of payments position. While bourbon is slowly but steadily forging ahead, it is regrettable but true that Scotch is still the preferred drink in many countries. This is the fault of the canny British who deliberately instilled this preference while helpless colonies, dependencies, mandates, protectorates, etc. languished in their imperial clutches.

Two possibilities come to mind:

(1) After World War II, before Scotland's major industry had been able to resume full production, an American product called "Scotch type" was put on the market. None of it was very good but some of it was not very bad. It was perfectly adequate for the second round of drinks at large dimly lit garden parties. Nearly twenty years have passed since that period. Surely American enterprise should be able to respond to today's challenge and come up with a totally acceptable product.

(2) In the course of my career I have on occasion had brief acquaintances with Japanese brands of Scotch. Some were quite potable. A recent article in the NEW YORKER sings the praises to a degree rather unusual for that generally bored magazine of a Scotch whiskey the Spanish have developed. Should we not investigate as to whether there are some surplus PL-480 yen or pesetas which we could use to acquire some of these products? If, as is usually the case, the military have gotten in ahead of us and consumed all supplies of these currencies, we should look into a deal whereby we could swap surplus American grain for Japanese and Spanish Scotch. I understand that the Army's PX system in Europe has just concluded an arrangement highly satisfactory to all participants wherehy American wheat is exchanged for German cuckoo clocks. I leave it to the reader to determine whether it is cuckoo clocks or Scotch which can contribute the most to the national security.

Gobbi

I considered pressing these suggestions on the Department on one of those form-things, but I have modestly desisted. For one thing, since I am stationed in the field at present, the large cash award I would most certainly receive would simply further complicate our already difficult balance of payments position. My principal object in submitting these ideas is to indicate to the wide and influential circle of readers of the Foreign Service JOURNAL that there is one Foreign Service officer at least, and at that a Foreign Service officer who is an enthusiastic consumer of Scotch whisky, who asks not what his country should do for him but what he may do for his country.

S. F. M.

Cairo

Christmas Dinner Dance

AAFSW has already begun its plans for the Christmas Dinner Dance for Foreign Service Teen-Agers. One of the problems we always encounter is trying to get the word to all the eligible teen agers who will be in the Washington area at Christmas time. Parents, please send in the names and addresses of your offspring (grade and age would help, too) now, in time for the November mailings. The dance includes ninth graders and above. We are particularly anxious to include the college-age group. Last year there were forty of these college-age youngsters; they were surprised and enthusiastic about the fun they had.

A note to Christmas Dance, AAFSW, Box 4931, Washington 8, D. C. is enough. But, parents, overseas and at home, PLEASE mail it in time.

MRS. ALBERT K. LUDY
Past Chairman

Arlington, Va.

Old Journals Needed

I STILL save my copies of the JOURNAL, and enjoy them greatly, and, in a rare moment of sorting and tidying, I find that my December, 1960, issue is missing—strayed or loaned to some would-be Foreign Service boy or girl seeking information on the best of careers. To you and to anyone who can lend a hand, many thanks.

Retirement keeps me so busy that until I can retire from retirement my visits to Washington are brief. This spring I took a trip to the Middle East —Lebanon, Iran and Kuwait—which I always wanted to see and never did. That part of the world is as fascinating as I thought it would be, and I very much enjoyed seeing a number of Foreign Service friends along the way.

KATHLEEN MOLESWORTH

Austin, Texas

Editor's Note: Our files, unfortunately, have been cleaned out, too. Do any of our readers have copies of this popular issue? We are also lacking file copies of January '62 and '63; February '63; March '61 and '63.

F.Y.I.

I'M SURE that all the exhausted bureaucrats concerned with the production of "Department of State 1963" appreciate Exhausted Bureaucrat's kind words about it in the recent Foreign Service JOURNAL.

Some of your readers may not be aware that the book is on sale at the Department of State Recreation Association Store in the Department, where it can be obtained by members hoth more conveniently and more inexpensively ($1.25) than from the Government Printing Office.

One of the purposes of this publication is to contribute to public awareness of the Foreign Service and understanding of its work. It can only do this, of course, if it reaches a significant public; and Departmental resources for distribution are necessarily limited. Anything FSJ readers can do to broaden this public by getting the book in more hands will, I think they would agree, be a blow in a good cause.

W. D. BLAIR, JR.
Director
Office of Media Services

Washington

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

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